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Preface
The present thesis is a collection of three papers written at the University of
Kiel during my period as a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Economics.
The ﬁrst two papers are joint work with Martin Quaas. The paper Does the
stock size of a ﬁsh stock increase with environmental uncertainties? has been
published in Environmental and Resource Economics (2013). My contribution
mainly includes the model set-up, the analysis of the quantitative examples and
most of the writing. The paper Optimal harvest control rules for stochastic ﬁsh
stocks when stakeholders are risk averse has been submitted for publication in
Marine Resource Economics and is currently under review. Here, I contribute to
the paper by doing the estimations and numerical calculations of the application
and most of the writing. The third paper is the single-authored paper How to
deal with ocean acidiﬁcation in ﬁsheries management - An example on Norwegian
coastal cod.
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Introduction
Uncertainty plays an important role in almost all economic decisions. This
particularly holds for the management of marine ﬁsh stocks. Virtually everything
about a marine population is poorly known; some aspects may be almost com-
pletely unknown, even for important species with long history of ﬁshing. Past and
present stock abundance, and biological characteristics such as growth, natural
mortality and reproduction rates, though important to management decisions, are
usually highly uncertain.1
Although ﬁsheries assessment methods are being continuously improved the
uncertainties inherent in ﬁshery models will never be completely solved and espe-
cially stock growth will to some extent remain unpredictable. Indeed, the develop-
ment of the ﬁsh stock, i.e. the sum of reproduction, growth in weight and length,
and natural mortality, is highly dependent on environmental conditions, e.g. on
the chemical composition of the seawater like pH-value, oxygen concentration and
salinity, on the temperature and currents, but also on the interaction with other
species in the ecosystem.2 These conditions ﬂuctuate and are often unknown to
the ﬁshery manager at the time the management decision is made. Hence, the
presence of uncertainties in the environmental conditions should be considered in
the management of ﬁsh stocks.
In my dissertation I examine how the optimal ﬁshery management will be inﬂu-
enced by uncertain environmental conditions. It is a cumulative work consisting of
three paper projects dealing with diﬀerent aspects of optimal ﬁshery management
under environmental uncertainties.
The ﬁrst paper "Does the optimal size of a ﬁsh stock increase with en-
vironmental uncertainties?", which is a joint work with Martin Quaas, com-
pares the optimal management under stochastic stock growth with the optimal
1Clark, C.W. (2006) The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries - Economic Models and Human Be-
havior. Cambridge university press.
2Hilborn, R., Walters, C.J. (1992) Quantitative Fisheries Stock Assessment - Choice, Dynam-
ics and Uncertainty. Kluwer Acadamic Publishers.
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management in a deterministic benchmark model. We found that the optimal
stock size in a stochastic stock growth model could be higher or lower than in the
deterministic setting, depending on the prudence of the value function, which in
turn depends on the biomass growth function, the proﬁt function and the von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the ﬁshermen. This paper contributes
to the already broad body of literature dealing with optimal resource management
under stochastic stock growth by providing a deeper understanding and an intu-
itive explanation of the inﬂuence of environmental uncertainties on the optimal
ﬁshery management. Furthermore by applying our model to two existing ﬁsh-
eries, incorporating the estimated variance in stock growth and the estimated cost
function, we provide valid results for ﬁshery management.
The second paper "Optimal harvest control rules for stochastic ﬁsh
stocks when stakeholders are risk averse" is a joint work with Martin Quaas.
In this paper we determine optimal harvest rules for diﬀerent degrees of risk aver-
sion among stakeholders, precisely among ﬁshermen and consumers. With a higher
degree of risk aversion, the optimal harvest control rule becomes ﬂatter and shifts
more uncertainty from harvest to the stock. Mean and coeﬃcient of variation
(CV) of harvest will decrease, while the CV of the resource stock will increase.
The eﬀect of risk aversion on the mean resource stock is ambiguous. Risk aversion
in stochastic ﬁshery models has mostly been neglected in the literature with only
very few articles dealing with speciﬁc aspects of risk aversion. We further ﬁll the
gap by deriving analytical solutions for a class of speciﬁc discrete time models, and
numerical results in an application to the Eastern Baltic cod ﬁshery.
In my last paper "How to deal with ocean acidiﬁcation in ﬁshery man-
agement - an example on Norwegian coastal cod" I consider a special case
of uncertainty in environmental conditions, i.e. the inﬂuence of ocean acidiﬁca-
tion on optimal ﬁshery management. I consider how results from laboratory-based
experiments on the physiological eﬀects of decreasing pH-values could be scaled
to population processes as a part of an ecological-economic model. In particular I
demonstrate a way to include an acidic-induced higher mortality in early-life stages
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of a ﬁsh into the stock-recruitment relationship and thus into an age-structured
ﬁshery model. Research on the economic consequences of ocean acidiﬁcation is
quite new and to my knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper which studies the optimal
ﬁshery management under ocean acidiﬁcation.
All three papers demonstrate that uncertainty in environmental conditions will
inﬂuence the optimal ﬁshery management. The numerical applications have shown
that the optimal feedback rule with stochastic stock growth will not diﬀer signif-
icantly from the one in a deterministic setting. But environmental uncertainty
has a great eﬀect on the inter-temporal harvesting possibilities and thus plays an
important role for risk-averse stakeholders. Risk aversion will shift risk from har-
vest to stock and will therefore smooth out extreme ﬂuctuations in inter-annual
harvest rates. While in the ﬁrst two papers uncertainty is represented by an inde-
pendent identically distributed random variable, other forms of uncertainty could
have deviating eﬀects on the optimal ﬁshery management. The eﬀect of exacer-
bating environmental conditions on harvesting possibilities e.g. I have studied in
my third paper.
Further research will be needed by including environmental uncertainties in a
greater context, adding e.g. multiple uncertainties, ecosystem interactions, and
evolving climate change, to improve the basis of ﬁsheries management recommen-
dations.
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Does the optimal size of a fish stock increase with
environmental uncertainties?∗
Ute Kapaun§ and Martin F. Quaas
Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Germany
September 29, 2012
Abstract. We analyze the effect of environmental uncertainties on optimal fish-
ery management in a bio-economic fishery model. Unlike most of the literature
on resource economics, but in line with ecological models, we allow the different
biological processes of survival and recruitment to be affected differently by en-
vironmental uncertainties. We show that the overall effect of uncertainty on the
optimal size of a fish stock is ambiguous, depending on the prudence of the value
function. For the case of a risk-neutral fishery manager, the overall effect depends
on the relative magnitude of two opposing effects, the ‘convex-cost effect’ and the
‘gambling effect’. We apply the analysis to the Baltic cod and the North Sea her-
ring fisheries, concluding that for risk neutral agents the net effect of environmental
uncertainties on the optimal size of these fish stocks is negative, albeit small in
absolute value. Under risk aversion, the effect on optimal stock size is positive for
sufficiently high coefficients of constant relative risk aversion.
Keywords: fishery economics, environmental uncertainty, constant escapement,
risk aversion, prudence
JEL-Classification: Q22, Q57
∗This paper has been published in Environmental and Resource Economics 54 (2), 293-310
(doi: 10.1007/s10640-012-9606-y)
§Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Olshausenstr. 40, 24118
Kiel, Germany. Email: kapaun@economics.uni-kiel.de.
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Introduction
Environmental uncertainties have important effects on the development of fish
stocks (Hilborn and Walters 1992). Accordingly, stochastic fluctuations in envi-
ronmental variables such as temperature, salinity, or oxygen concentration, have
to be taken into account when discussing optimal fishery management. For risk-
neutral agents, Reed (1979) shows that optimal management of a fish stock is
characterized by a constant escapement policy, i.e. it ensures that a constant pro-
portion of the stock remains in the sea after fishing.1 Reed (1979) also shows that
the optimal constant escapement level in a stochastic environment is equal to,
or larger than, the optimal escapement level in a deterministic setting where the
unit harvesting cost function fulfills a number of regularity assumptions. Various
articles have refined Reed’s seminal work by adding multiple uncertainties (Clark
and Kirkwood 1986, Sethi et al. 2005), costly capital adjustments (Singh et al.
2006), choice of regulatory instrument (Weitzman 2002), spatial structure of the
resource, (Costello and Polasky 2008) and management with environmental predic-
tion (Costello et al. 2001). All these studies assume risk-neutral decision-makers.2
One thing that most of these models have in common is that environmental
stochasticity is modeled by an i.i.d. random variable zt multiplied by the average
stock-growth function f(xt) of the resource stock xt at time t, i.e. xt+1 = zt ·f(xt).3
The stock-growth function combines the different biological processes of re-
cruitment (young fish entering the harvested stock), survival, and growth in terms
of weight. Multiplying the average stock-growth function by one random variable
implies that all biological processes are equally affected by environmental fluctua-
1Reed assumes an objective function that is linear in harvest, which implies that neither the
consumer nor the fishermen show risk aversion
2Pindyck (1984) studies the management of renewable resources under uncertainty in con-
tinuous time by adding a stochastic differential equation of the Ito type, assuming a downward
sloping demand function. This can be interpreted as reflecting risk-aversion of consumers.
3Costello et al. (2001) do not restrict the disturbance to be multiplicative to the stock growth,
but still assume that zt is i.i.d with mean one, which implies that zt is somehow multiplicatively
connected.
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tions. From a biological point of view, however, it seems more plausible to assume
that the respective processes would be influenced differently by fluctuations in the
environmental conditions. In most ecological stock-assessment models of marine
fish populations the reproduction process is considered to be more sensitive to en-
vironmental fluctuations than the survival of adult fish, which is usually assumed
to be constant.4 Accordingly, we split the stock-growth function into two func-
tions describing the processes of recruitment and growth on the one hand and of
adults surviving natural mortality on the other. The recruitment and growth are
assumed to be stochastic, whereas natural mortality is assumed to be fixed.
We examine the effect of uncertainty on the optimal size of a fish stock un-
der both risk neutrality and risk aversion. Whether or not optimal escapement
increases with uncertainty is connected with the prudence (Kimball 1990) of the
value function. If the value function of the fishery considered exhibits positive
prudence, the optimal policy will involve precautionary savings in the natural cap-
ital stock and hence higher stock size under uncertainty than in the deterministic
case. If the value function exhibits negative prudence, the optimal stock size under
uncertainty will be lower than in the deterministic setting. As the value function
depends on (i) the biomass growth function, (ii) the profit function, and (iii) the
representative fisherman’s utility function, all three have an influence on whether
optimal escapement increases or decreases with environmental uncertainty.
Considering risk-neutral stakeholders first, we show that the overall effect of
uncertainty on the optimal size of a fish stock is ambiguous, depending on the rel-
ative magnitude of two opposing effects, the ‘convex-cost effect’ and the ‘gambling
effect’. The ‘convex-cost effect’ reduces optimal escapement under uncertainty over
and against the deterministic case. Because harvesting costs are convex in the fish
stock, expected harvesting costs are larger when fish stock growth is uncertain
than they are at an expected stock level. The ‘gambling effect’, on the other hand,
increases optimal escapement under uncertainty. It comes about because uncer-
4The influence of environmental conditions differ for different species. For Baltic cod and
North Sea herring see ICES Advice 2010a, 2010b, Books 6 (herring) and 8 (cod).
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tainty is multiplicatively connected to stock growth, so the distribution of the
next period’s resource rents is positively skewed. This effect induces a risk-neutral
fishery manager to ‘bet’ on favorable environmental conditions.
For the case of a risk-averse representative fisherman, we show for a special case
that optimal escapement increases with uncertainty if the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is large enough.
In quantitative terms, we apply the model to Eastern Baltic cod and North
Sea herring fisheries and conclude that under risk neutrality the net effect of envi-
ronmental uncertainties on the optimal size of these fish stocks is negative, albeit
small in absolute value. Under risk aversion we observe a positive effect of uncer-
tainty on optimal stock size for sufficiently high coefficients of constant relative
risk aversion.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we set up the model
and solve the corresponding optimization problem. In Section 2 we consider op-
timal harvesting under risk neutrality, identifying the convex-cost effect and the
gambling effect. The case of a risk-averse representative fisherman is discussed
analytically in Section 3. We then apply our model to fisheries for Baltic cod (Sec-
tion 4) and North Sea herring (Section 5), considering both risk neutrality and
risk aversion. Section 6 summarizes and discusses the results.
1 A Fishery Model with Environmental Uncertainty
We consider a simple biomass model with stochastic recruitment in discrete time.
The growth of biomass xt from time step t to t+ 1 is described by the equation
xt+1 = g(st) + zt r(st), (1)
where st denotes the escapement, i.e. the biomass that remains in the ecosystem
after harvest ht so that st = xt−ht. The period between t and t+1 is divided into
two parts. Harvesting takes place in the first part. In the second, the remaining
fish biomass, i.e. the escapement, reproduces and grows in weight. A fraction of
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the fish dies by natural causes. The term g(s) represents the survival of adult
fish. The reproduction and growth process is represented as the stock-recruitment
relationship r(s).
Both functions are differentiable and non-decreasing. The expected recruitment
at stock size st is described by the strictly concave function r(st). Furthermore,
the recruitment process is sensitive to environmental uncertainty, represented by
the random variable zt, which is independent and identically distributed over time
with an expected value equal to one, E[zt] = 1. The survival of adult fish g(st),
by contrast, is deterministic. It can be concave or linear in s. In the latter case
the natural mortality rate of adult fish is fixed. The assumption of deterministic
mortality at a constant rate is common in biological stock assessment models
(Hilborn andWalters 1992, ICES 2010a,b). We briefly discuss the case of stochastic
mortality in Appendix D.
The price per unit of fish p is constant, i.e. the fishery is small compared to
the overall market. We assume a generalized Schaefer production function for
the instantaneous harvest rate h˜ in the fishing season, h˜ = q(x˜)Kt. We use q(x˜)
to denote the catch per unit of effort, Kt to denote the effort of harvesting fish
(which is assumed to be constant throughout the fishing season), and x˜ to denote
the current stock size. Accordingly, x˜ = xt at the beginning of year t’s fishing
season and x˜ = st at the end (Reed 1979, Clark 1990). Harvesting costs Ct are
proportional to effort Kt, with ζ as the costs per unit effort Ct = ζ Kt. Thus we
obtain a unit cost function for harvesting fish, c(x˜) = ζ/q(x˜). We assume that,
in general, unit harvesting costs are weakly decreasing and weakly convex in the
stock size, i.e. c′(x˜) ≤ 0 and c′′(x˜) ≥ 0. This means that the catch per unit of
effort q(x) is non-decreasing with population abundance. Convexity also implies
that the increase of the unit harvesting costs induced by a one-unit decrease in
stock is greater for lower stock abundance than for higher stock abundance. A
common specification of the harvesting cost function is c(x˜) = c x˜−χ with χ > 0.
In that special case x˜ c(x˜) is strictly concave (for 0 < χ < 1), constant (for χ = 1),
or strictly convex (for χ > 1). For χ = 0, catch per unit effort is independent of
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stock abundance, the unit harvesting cost is constant with C = ζ, and x˜ c(x˜) is
linear in stock. In empirical terms the most relevant case is χ ∈ (0, 1). In a study
of 297 fisheries, Harley et al. (2001) find typical values of χ to be between 0.64
and 0.75.
During the harvesting season, each ton of fish caught reduces the stock by one
ton. Therefore the aggregate annual profit Πt is obtained by integrating the flow of
profits over the whole fishing season Πt =
∫ xt
st
(p− c(x˜)) dx˜. The fishery manager
aims to maximize the well-being of the representative fisherman earning his income
from fishing profits:5
max
st
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
ρt−1u (Πt) dx˜
]
subject to (1). (2)
Here the operator E denotes the expectation over the probability distribution of
the random process {zt} and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Fishermen are
typically averse to fluctuations in income. We find this, for example, reflected
in the management plans for Baltic cod which contain rules to limit fluctuations
in total allowable catches from year to year.6 We take this effect into account by
assuming that instantaneous utility u(Πt) derived from fishing income is increasing
and weakly concave, u′(Πt) > 0 and u′′(Πt) ≤ 0.7 For a risk-neutral fisherman, the
instantaneous utility function is linear, u(Πt) ≡ Πt. For a risk-averse fisherman,
the instantaneous utility function is strictly concave, u′′(Πt) < 0.
Using J(x) to denote the value function associated with the stochastic opti-
mization problem (2), the Bellman equation reads8
J(x) = max
s
{
u
(∫ x
s
(p− c(x˜)) dx˜
)
+ ρE
[
J
(
g(s) + z r(s)
)]}
(3)
5We follow the convention of the previous literature and chose the escapement as the control
variable.
6Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007 of 18. September 2007.
7The assumption of a strictly concave utility function is sensible if fishermen have imperfect
access to capital markets. Experimental evidence suggests that a typical value for the coefficient
of relative risk aversion is about 0.74 (Andersen et al. 2008).
8Because the optimization problem (2) is autonomous, the value function J(x) does not
depend on time.
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In the following, we use S∗(x) to denote the optimal feedback policy obtained as
a solution of (3) for the stochastic case and S¯∗(x) to denote the optimal feedback
policy for the corresponding deterministic model, where zt ≡ 1 for all t. The
question we are asking in this paper is whether, for a given stock size x, the
solution S∗(x) for the stochastic problem is larger than, equal to, or smaller than
the solution S¯∗(x) for the deterministic model.
To adress this question, we consider the first-order condition for optimal es-
capement
u′
(∫ x
s
(p− c(x˜)) dx˜
) (
p− c(s)) = ρE [ d
ds
J
(
g(s) + z r(s)
)]
. (4)
This condition states that for the optimal escapement level s∗ at a given stock
size x the current marginal profits of the last unit of fish harvested (left-hand side,
LHS) equal the discounted expected marginal profits of an additional unit of fish
that escapes fishing (right-hand side, RHS). Uncertainty only makes a difference to
the RHS of this equation. As the LHS is monotonically increasing in s, the optimal
escapement level at a given stock size x will increase with the RHS of (4). Thus,
the optimal escapement level will be higher (lower) under uncertainty than with
the deterministic setting if the RHS of (4) is higher (lower) when z is stochastic
than in the deterministic case z ≡ 1. This, in turn, depends on the curvature of the
derivative of the value function with respect to the escapement level, dJ
(
g(s) +
z r(s)
)
/ds, in z. So the question whether or not optimal escapement increases
with uncertainty is connected to the prudence (Kimball 1990) of the value function
J(g(s) + z r(s)).
Prudence describes “the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face
of uncertainty, in contrast to ‘risk aversion’, which is how much one dislikes un-
certainty and would turn away from uncertainty if possible” (Kimball 1990:54).
A positive prudence of the value function thus implies precautionary savings in
the natural capital stock and hence higher stock size under uncertainty. Positive
prudence is given if dJ
(
g(s) + z r(s)
)
/ds is convex in the random variable z. The
index of absolute prudence is defined by d2
dz2
(
dJ
(
g(s) + z r(s)
)
/ds
)
. If this index is
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positive (negative), we speak of positive (negative) prudence of the value function.
Under positive (negative) prudence the optimal stock size under uncertainty will
be higher (lower) than in the deterministic setting.
As the value function depends on (i) the biomass growth function, (ii) the
profit function, and (iii) the representative fisherman’s utility function, all three
have an influence on whether optimal escapement increases or decreases with envi-
ronmental uncertainty. For the detailed analysis of the combined effect we proceed
in three stages. In Section 2 we study how optimal harvesting is affected by risk
when fishermen are risk-neutral. Section 3 derives analytical results for risk-averse
fishermen, but it requires relatively restrictive assumptions on biomass growth
function, harvesting technology, and preferences to derive a closed-form expres-
sion for the value function. In section 4 and 5 we apply our analysis to the Baltic
cod and North Sea herring fisheries.
2 Optimal Harvesting under Risk Neutrality
For the risk-neutral case u(Πt) ≡ Πt, both the LHS and the RHS of (4) are indepen-
dent of the current stock size x. Thus, the solution of this stochastic optimization
problem is state-independent (see Appendix A). Optimal feedback policy S∗(x) is
the most rapid approach to the constant optimal escapement level s∗,
S∗(x) = s∗ if x > s∗ and S∗(x) = x otherwise. (5)
The optimal escapement level s∗ is determined by the following condition (see
Appendix B):
p− c(s∗) = ρ g′(s∗)
[
p− Ez
[
c
(
g(s∗) + zt r(s∗)
)]]
+ ρ r′(s∗)
[
p− Ez
[
zt c
(
g(s∗) + z r(s∗)
)]]
(6)
This condition states that for the optimal escapement level s∗ current marginal
profits from the last unit of fish harvested equal the discounted expected marginal
profits from an additional unit that escapes fishing. The expected marginal profit
12
on the RHS of (6) can be divided into two effects. The first term on the RHS
represents the expected marginal profits from the additional surviving adults. The
second term on the RHS stands for the expected marginal profits from additional
recruits.
In the risk-neutral case, the curvature properties of the marginal cost function
are essential to determine the prudence of the value function. To compare the op-
timal escapement level in the stochastic case with the optimal escapement level s¯∗
in the deterministic case (i.e., for zt ≡ 1 in Equation (1)), we consider the following
equivalent to condition (6) in the deterministic setting:
p− c(s¯∗) = ρ g′(s¯∗)
[
p− c
[
g(s¯∗) + r(s¯∗)
]]
+ ρ r′(s¯∗)
[
p− c
[
g(s¯∗) + r(s¯∗)
]]
. (7)
We obtain a higher (lower) optimal escapement level when the next period’s ex-
pected marginal costs are lower (higher) than the marginal costs at the expected
next period’s stock level (which coincides with the deterministic case as we have
Ez[z] = 1). We consider the effects for additional surviving adults and for ad-
ditional recruitment separately. The first term on the RHS of condition (6) in
the stochastic case is smaller than the first term on the RHS of condition (7) in
the deterministic case. This is due to the convexity of the marginal harvesting
cost function. We refer to this effect as the ‘convex-cost effect’. The second term
on the RHS of condition (6) will be larger than the second term on the RHS of
condition (7) if function x˜ c(x˜) is concave. We refer to this effect as the ‘gambling
effect’.
2.1 Convex-cost effect
If marginal harvesting costs are convex in the fish stock, they will also be convex in
the random variable. Expectation E
[
c
(
g(s∗) + zt r(s∗)
)]
is over a convex function
of the random variable, so expected marginal harvesting costs are greater than
the marginal costs at expected stock growth c
(
g(s∗) + r(s∗)
)
as E[z] = 1. The
convex marginal cost function implies that the increase in marginal harvesting
costs for a stock growth below the mean is greater than the decrease in marginal
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harvesting costs for a stock growth above the mean. Accordingly, the expected
marginal harvesting costs are greater under uncertainty than in the deterministic
case. We refer to this effect, which tends to reduce the optimal escapement level,
as the convex-cost effect.
Intuitively, the effect of convex marginal harvesting costs is similar to the effect
of risk aversion, so it is optimal to invest less if the asset is risky. Accordingly, it
is also intuitive that under uncertainty the convex-cost effect will reduce optimal
escapement over and against the deterministic model. More precisely, the con-
vexity of marginal harvesting costs reduces the prudence of the value function. If
the convex-cost effect were the only effect present, the prudence of the value func-
tion would be unambiguously negative, and the optimal escapement level would
decrease with environmental uncertainty.
2.2 Gambling effect
If the function x˜ c(x˜) is convex, the second term on the RHS of condition (6) will
be lower than the second term on the RHS of (7). The prudence of the value
function would be unambiguously negative, so the optimal escapement level under
uncertainty would be unambiguously lower than in the deterministic setting.
As set out earlier, the more relevant case in empirical terms is where x˜ c(x˜) is
concave in x˜. Here the expression zt c
(
g(s∗) + zt r(s∗)
)
is a concave function in the
random variable zt. The expected marginal costs E
[
zt c
(
g(s∗)+zt r(s∗)
)]
will then
be smaller than the marginal costs at expected stock growth c
(
g(s∗) +E[z] r(s∗)
)
(which coincides with the deterministic case).
The economic intuition for this effect is as follows: As uncertainty is multi-
plicatively connected with stock growth, the distribution of next period’s resource
rents is positively skewed and has a fat tail at high rents. Under favorable en-
vironmental conditions, a marginal increase in current escapement will result in
a strong marginal increase in the fish stock, producing both a large harvest and
low marginal harvesting costs in the next period. Under adverse environmental
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conditions, marginal harvesting costs in the next period will be high because of
the low fish stock, but this effect is dampened by the fact that the harvest is small.
So the expected marginal increase in harvesting costs with a marginal increase in
escapement is lower than the marginal increase in harvesting costs under expected
stock growth. In other words, a risk-neutral fishery manager will tend to bet on
favorable environmental conditions. This is why we call this effect the gambling
effect.
The gambling effect tends to increase the prudence of the value function, i.e.
to increase the optimal escapement level under environmental uncertainty.9
Since the convex-cost effect and the gambling effect work in opposite directions,
the overall result is ambiguous. The optimal escapement level could be either
higher or lower than in the deterministic case.10
2.3 A special case: when survival is proportional to recruit-
ment
In our model, a special case arises if survival is proportional to recruitment, i.e. if
there exists some κ ∈ [0, 1) such that (1 − κ) g(s) = κ r(s). In this case, biomass
growth (equation 1) can be written as
xt+1 = z˜t f(st), (8)
where z˜ = κ+ (1− κ) z is a random variable with mean 1 and f(s) ≡ r(s)/(1− κ)
is the expected biomass growth function. This special case deserves attention, as
the model for it is equivalent to the model studied by Reed (1979). In the latter
9It may appear contradictory that the ‘gambling effect’ leads to a higher degree of prudence.
However, the term prudence has been coined because of its effect – a higher degree of prudence
induces higher precautionary savings – and not because of a particular motivation why an agent
saves more under uncertainty.
10Under constant unit harvesting costs both the gambling and the convex-cost effect vanish
and the optimal escapement level in the stochastic and deterministic model are the same.
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case the optimality condition (6) simplifies to
p− c(s∗) = ρf ′(s∗)
(
p− Ez˜
[
z c
(
z˜ f(s∗)
)])
. (9)
If the function x˜ c(x˜) is concave in x˜, the optimal escapement level in the stochastic
model will be unambiguously higher than in the deterministic case.11 In other
words the gambling effect will outweighs the convex-cost effect.
If we further specify the unit cost function c(x) = c x−χ with χ ∈ (0, 1)
and assume a log-normal distribution of environmental stochasticity z˜ with mean
µz˜ = 1 and standard deviation σz˜, condition (9) can be written as follows (see
Appendix C):
p− c(s∗) = ρf ′(s∗)
(
p− c f(s
∗)−χ
(1 + σ2z˜)
χ (1−χ)
2
)
, (10)
The left hand-side of this equation increases with the degree of uncertainty, as
measured by the variance σ2z˜ . Accordingly, the optimal escapement level increases
monotonically with uncertainty. In quantitative terms, the influence of uncertainty
on the optimal escapement level will typically be small. It is maximal for χ = 1/2,
as then the exponent of the factor (1 + σ2z˜)χ (1−χ)/2 on the RHS of (10) reaches its
maximum for all values of χ ∈ (0, 1). But even in this case and for an unrealistically
high degree of uncertainty σ2z˜ = 1, this factor changes the RHS of (10) by less than
ten percent, as (1 + σ2z˜)χ (1−χ)/2 = 21/8 < 1.10.
3 Optimal Harvesting under Risk Aversion
In the case of risk aversion, it is in general not possible to solve the Bellman equa-
tion (3) analytically. For special cases an analytical solution is however feasible.12
11Reed’s (1979) intuitive explanation for a higher optimal escapement level is that “the marginal
average annual harvesting cost in the stochastic model resulting from an increase in the escape-
ment level [...] is, because of the averaging process, less than the corresponding marginal cost in
the deterministic model.”
12To our knowledge, no analytically solvable model has been available for the discrete-time
model so far. For a similar problem in continuous time, Pindyck (1984) provides three examples
of analytically solvable models.
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To study the case of a risk-averse representative fisherman analytically, we thus
have to further specify the model.
First, we neglect harvesting costs in this section, i.e. we assume c(x˜) ≡ 0. This
not only simplifies the analysis, it also enables us to better isolate the effect of risk
aversion. The point is that in the absence of harvesting costs, both the convex-cost
effect and the gambling effect vanish, and optimal escapement for the risk-neutral
case would be independent of uncertainty.
Second, we focus on the case where survival is proportional to recruitment and
the biomass growth function is given by (8). We furthermore assume that the
biomass growth function f(s) has the functional form
f(s) =
(
α s1−φ + αβ1−φ
) 1
1−φ (11)
with positive constants α, β, and φ. A special case of this biomass growth function
is the Beverton-Holt function f(s) = (s/α)/(1 + (s/β)) obtained by setting φ = 2.
Third, we assume an instantaneous utility function with constant relative risk
aversion ϑ > 0,
u(Π(x, s)) =
ν
1− ϑ (x− s)
1−ϑ , (12)
with ν > 0. This model is analytically solvable for the special case φ = ϑ. In
Appendix E we show that the value function is
J(x) =
ψ1
1− ϑ x
1−ϑ + ψ2 (13)
with some constants ψ1 > 0 and ψ2, and that the optimal escapement rule is
s∗ =
(
ραE[z1−ϑ]
) 1
ϑ x. (14)
It is obvious that if ϑ < 1 (ϑ > 1), optimal escapement will be lower (higher), the
higher the uncertainty is. ϑ < 1 means not only that risk aversion is relatively low
but also that the curvature of the biomass growth function is relatively high.13
13If we again assume that z is log-normally distributed with variance σ2z , we obtain
(E[z1−ϑ])1/ϑ = (1 + σ2z)
(1−ϑ)/2 (see appendix C).
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We can again connect this result to the prudence of the value function J(z˜ f(s)).
In this case, the function inside the expectation operator on the RHS of (4) is
dJ(z˜ f(s))/ds = ψ1 z
1−ϑ α s1−ϑ. It is concave (convex) in ϑ if ϑ < 1 (ϑ > 1). Thus,
a value function that exhibits negative (positive) prudence will give rise to a lower
(higher) optimal escapement for ϑ < 1 (ϑ > 1).
4 Quantitative Example I: Baltic Cod Fishery
Our first quantitative example is the Baltic cod fishery. The water in the Baltic
Sea is brackish, making it a marginal area for cod. The fish population depends
on fluctuating fresh water inflows from the North Sea to increase the salinity level
to a degree where their eggs can hatch (Röckmann et al. 2007). Accordingly,
the recruitment process for Baltic cod is highly uncertain and represents a useful
example for the stochastic recruitment model.
To estimate the biological growth function we use stock assessment data (years
1966-2009) from the International Council of the Exploration of the Sea (ICES
2011). We combine the data for total stock biomass in year t, Xt, total harvest Ht
(as the sum of official landings and discards) and natural mortality (assumed to
be fixed at M = 0.2, as in the ICES stock assessments) to obtain the escapement
St and the recruitment biomass Rt as follows
St = Xt −Ht,
Rt = Xt+1 − e−0.2St.
The recruitment variable Rt thus encompasses both the reproduction process and
growth in weight. It is calculated as the total stock biomass at the beginning
of period t + 1 minus the fraction of period t’s escapement that survives natural
mortality. We assume that recruitment follows a stochastic Beverton-Holt (1957)
stock-recruitment function r(st) = zt α1 st/(1 + α2st).14 Using the Levenberg-
14We also estimated the more general growth function of r(st) =
(
α s1−φt + αβ1−φ
) 1
1−φ
, but
found the parameters to be not significant.
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Marquardt algorithm for nonlinear least squares, we estimated the equation
ln(Rt) = ln
(
α1 St
1 + α2 St
)
+ εt, (15)
assuming that εt is an independent and identically normally distributed random
variable with zero mean.15 We obtain estimates αˆ1 = 1.189 with a standard error
of 0.111, αˆ2 = 1.525 million tons with a standard error of 0.496 million tons, and
an estimate σˆ2 = 0.083 million tons for the standard deviation of zt = exp(εt).
Because of the logarithmic specification of (15), estimate αˆ1 is biased. For our
numerical computations, we use the adjusted value α1 = αˆ1 exp(−0.5 σˆ2) = 1.140.
To estimate the parameters of the harvesting function, we specify the cost
function C = ζKt and q(x˜) = q0 xχ. With this specification, total fishing effort in
year t is Kt =
∫ xt
st
q(x˜)−1d(x˜) = 1
q0 (1−χ) [x
1−χ − s1−χ] (Clark 1990). We use data
on effort as days at sea for the Danish fleet from (Fiskeriregnskabsstatistik 2007,
Fiskeridirektoratet 2007) and (ICES 2009) data for total biomass and escapement.
Using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm for nonlinear least squares we obtain
q0 = 5.162 tons per days at sea (standard error 2.173), and χ = 0.953 (standard
error 0.213). For prices and unit effort cost ζ, we use the estimate from Kronbak
(2002; 2005) and Quaas et al. (2010). Normalizing the price of a million tons of
harvest to unity, we obtain a unit effort cost parameter of ζ = 0.554, measured in
billions of Euros at million days at sea. For the unit harvesting cost parameter we
thus have ζ/q0 = 0.107 Euros/kg.
In sum, the functional specifications we use are
g(st) = e
−0.2 st
r(st) =
1.140 st
1 + 1.525 st
zt ∝ LOGN(1, 0.083)
p− c(x˜) = 1− 0.107 x˜−0.953
ρ =
1
1 + 0.05
15A Durbin-Watson test shows no autocorrelation in the error terms (DW = 1.718, p = 0.312).
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Our first step in the quantitative analysis for Baltic cod is to consider the opti-
mal escapement levels for a risk-neural representative fisherman. To determine the
optimal escapement levels in the deterministic and stochastic recruitment models,
we solve conditions (6) and (7) using these specifications numerically. For our sen-
sitivity analysis, we use random samples of 1000 sets of parameter values for α1,
α2, q0 and ζ, assuming that the parameter values are independently normally dis-
tributed with means and standard deviations as obtained from the estimations (or
variance-covariance matrix from the estimation for α1 and α2). For each parameter
set, we compute the optimal escapement and determine the standard deviation of
the sample of optimal escapement levels thus obtained.
The optimal escapement level for the deterministic model (where z ≡ 1) is
s¯∗ = 0.904 million tons, with a standard deviation of 0.257 million tons. For the
stochastic model we obtain s∗ = 0.902 million tons as the optimal escapement, with
a standard deviation of 0.255 million tons. Thus we have a slightly lower optimal
escapement level in the stochastic model than its deterministic counterpart, but
the difference of 1 619 tons (with a standard deviation of 657 tons) is small. This
indicates that while model uncertainty is substantial, it is not so large as to make
the quantitative results completely unreliable.
Next, we analyze how risk aversion influences the results. For this purpose,
we assume an instantaneous utility function with constant relative risk aversion
u(Πt) = Π
1−ϑ
t /(1 − ϑ) and use the same biomass growth function, marginal cost
function, and discount rate as before. We solve the stochastic optimization prob-
lem (2) numerically for different risk-aversion coefficients ϑ by numerically com-
puting the value function J(x). To do so, we use the collocation method (Miranda
and Fackler 2002), where the value function J(x) is approximated by a finite linear
combination of Chebychev polynomials.16
The results are shown in Figure 1. The upper panel shows the optimal feedback
16For cod (herring), we use 101 (212) collocation nodes on the interval x ∈ [0.1, 5] million tons
(x ∈ [0.1, 8] million tons). The optimization routines were implemented in Matlab. All program
codes will be made available as online supporting material.
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Figure 1: Optimal escapement for Eastern Baltic cod as a function of the rep-
resentative fisherman’s coefficient of risk aversion ϑ. Note that the scale on the
y-axis in the upper panel is in millions of tons, while it is in thousands of tons in
the lower panel.
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policies S∗(x) under uncertainty (σ2z = 0.0834) and S¯∗(x) in the deterministic case
for three different coefficients of risk aversion: the risk-neural case ϑ = 0, slight
risk aversion ϑ = 0.1, and stronger risk aversion ϑ = 0.5. For the risk-neutral
case, the optimal policy is the most rapid approach to constant escapement (cf.
section 2). The higher the risk aversion, the smoother the optimal policy becomes:
escapement is relatively lower (harvest is higher) at relatively low stock sizes, and
relatively higher (harvest is lower) at higher stock sizes.
For all three coefficients of risk aversion, there is hardly any difference between
the optimal policies under uncertainty and in the deterministic setting. The lower
panel in Figure 1 shows the difference S∗(x)− S¯∗(x) for three different stock levels,
x ∈ {0.15, 0.50, 1.8} million tons. Note that the scale of the y axis in the lower
panel is in thousands of tons, while in the upper panel it is in millions of tons.
This shows that the difference is well below 1 percent of the optimal escapement.
Although the overall effect is small, the effect of increasing risk aversion is unam-
biguous. The higher the coefficient of risk aversion is, the higher is the difference
in optimal escapement under uncertainty and in the deterministic case. The two
lower stock sizes considered (x = 0.15 and x = 0.50 million tons) are smaller
than the optimal escapement s∗ in the risk-neutral case. For these stock sizes, the
optimal escapement for ϑ → 0 is the same with and without uncertainty, as it
simply equals the current stock size. The higher stock size x = 1.8 million tons
is above s∗. In this case, the optimal escapement for a risk-neutral representative
fisherman is lower under uncertainty than in the deterministic case (see above).
With increasing risk aversion, the difference also becomes positive for this stock
size .
5 North Sea Herring Fishery
Our second case study is the North Sea herring fishery. Here we use the same
functional specifications as for the Baltic cod fishery. For North Sea herring,
we use the price and cost function from Nostbakken (2008), where p = 2.465
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NOK/ kg, ζ = 1, 189, 565 NOK/per vessel-year and a catchability per vessel-year
of q0 = 0.0011. We again normalize the price to unity and obtain ζ/(p∗q0) = 0.439
Euros/kg and χ = 1 as parameters of the cost function.
To estimate the parameters of the biological growth function, we use ICES
(1998; 2007) data for the period 1947-2005 to calculate the escapement St as the
product of the total biomassXt and e−F , where F is the mean fishing mortality rate
for age classes from 2 to 6. We again assume a deterministic natural mortality with
a rate of M = 0.16 (as in the ICES stock assessments for herring) and a Beverton-
Holt function for the stock-recruitment relationship. Using the same model (15)
and regression method as for cod, we obtain estimates αˆ1 = 2.048 (standard error
0.266), αˆ2 = 0.956 million tons (standard error 0.204 million tons), and σˆ2 = 0.104
million tons for the standard deviation of zt = exp(εt). Again, we use the adjusted
value α1 = αˆ1 exp(−0.5 σˆ2) = 1.9445 for our numerical analysis.17
For the risk-neutral case we compute an optimal escapement level s∗ = 2.769
million tons (with a standard deviation of 0.302 million tons) in the stochastic
model. In the deterministic model the optimal escapement level is s¯∗ = 2.780
million tons.Thus we again observe a slightly lower optimal escapement level in
the stochastic case. The difference is larger than with the Baltic cod fishery but
at 10 356 tons (with a standard deviation of 4 784 tons) still quite small.
In Fig.2 we show the optimal policies for risk-averse fishermen. The results are
similar to those obtained for Baltic cod. The differences in optimal escapements
between the stochastic and deterministic cases are small in absolute value. The
unambiguous effect of risk aversion is that difference increases and, for sufficiently
high degrees of risk aversion, optimal escapement is higher under uncertainty than
in the deterministic case.
17 The Durbin-Watson test revealed autocorrelation in the error term (DW = 1.014, p =
3.647 ∗ 10−5). As Nostbakken (2008) states, “[s]ome problems of autocorrelation are [...] in-
evitable when using a simple surplus growth model to explain the complex dynamics of the fish
stock”. Considering an autoregressive model for the error term means that another stock variable
has to be included in the model. This would greatly increase the complexity of the stochastic
optimization problem, which is becond the scope of the present paper.
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Figure 2: Optimal escapement for North Sea herring as a function of the represen-
tative fisherman’s coefficient of risk aversion ϑ. Note that the scale on the y-axis
in the upper panel is in millions of tons, while it is in thousands of tons in the
lower panel.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we studied the effects of environmental uncertainties on optimal fish-
ery management for both risk-neutral and risk-averse fishermen. To account for
natural mortality and recruitment, we split the stock growth function of the fish
stock into two processes. Following the biological approach taken in stock assess-
ment models, we assume that natural mortality is fixed at a given value. The
recruitment process, by contrast, depends on stochastically fluctuating environ-
mental conditions.
We have demonstrated that the optimal escapement level can be higher or lower
than in the deterministic setting, depending on the prudence of the value function.
This in turn depends on (i) the biomass growth function, (ii) the profit function
and (iii) the representative fisherman’s utility function. Positive prudence gives
rise to higher optimal escapement, whereas negative prudence results in a lower
optimal escapement level.
For risk-neutral fisherman we showed that the question whether or not the
optimal escapement increases with uncertainty is influenced by two counteracting
cost effects: the convex-cost effect and the gambling effect. The convex-cost effect
results from higher expected marginal costs due to the convexity of the cost func-
tion and tends to reduce optimal escapement. Intuitively, the convex-cost effect
means that optimal investment is smaller when the asset is risky. The gambling
effect results from lower expected marginal costs under uncertainty because the
harvestable biomass increases more strongly under favorable environmental condi-
tions than under adverse environmental conditions. The gambling effect thus tends
to increase optimal escapement. The finding that the effect of uncertainty on the
optimal size of the fish stock is ambiguous under risk neutrality is in contrast to
Reed’s (1979) unambiguous result that the optimal constant escapement level in
a stochastic environment is equal to, or larger than, the optimal escapement level
in a deterministic setting. This is because we have allowed that the processes of
recruitment and adult survival are affected differently by environmental uncertain-
25
ties. In the paper we have considered the case where recruitment is uncertain, but
survival is deterministic. In Appendix D we show that the effect of uncertainty is
ambiguous also in the case of stochastic survival. Under risk aversion, the effect
of uncertainty on optimal escapement is still ambiguous, depending on the stock
growth function parameter and the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion.
To quantify the effect of uncertainty both under risk neutrality and risk aver-
sion, we applied the model to the Baltic cod and the North Sea herring fisheries.
Under risk neutrality we observed in both fisheries lower optimal escapement in
the stochastic environment than in the deterministic setting, but the difference is
small in absolute value. In the setting with risk-averse fishermen we found higher
optimal escapement levels for sufficiently high coefficients of constant relative risk
aversion. Again, the difference is very small, and well below one percent of optimal
escapement.
This finding is in line with previous results of Sethi et al. (2005) who analyze the
effect of multiple uncertainties on optimal fishery management. Their simulations
show that stock growth uncertainty has only minor effects on the optimal fishery
management. Our paper completes their findings: By introducing the two cost-
effects and refering to the notion of prudence, we provide a deeper understanding
and an intuitive explanation of the influence of environmental uncertainties on the
optimal fishery management. We extend the analysis to the case of risk aversion,
both analytically and numerically. Furthermore by applying our model to two real
fisheries, incorporating the estimated variance in stock growth and the estimated
cost function, we provide valid results for fishery management.
Our quantiative results show that the optimal feedback policy is not very
strongly affected by environmental uncertainties. Our results suggest that even
if fluctuations in environmental conditions would increase, for example due to cli-
mate change, there is little need to adapt fishery management recommendations.
One should keep in mind, however, that other forms of uncertainty may have a
much stronger effect, including measurement uncertainty with regard to the size of
the fish stock (Sethi et al. 2005), or the possibility of regime shifts (Polasky et al.
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2011, de Zeeuw and Zemel 2012).
Appendix
A Dynamic Programming and Constant Escapement Policy
We consider the problem for a finite time horizon T . The result for an infinite
time horizon is then obtained by letting T →∞. The risk neutral fishery manager
faces the following maximization problem:
max
st
E
[ T∑
t=1
ρt−1
∫ xt
xt−ht
p− c(x˜) dx˜
]
(16)
s.t. xt+1 = g(st) + zt r(st). (17)
By letting Π(xt, st) = pi(xt) − pi(st) =
∫ xt
st
pi′(v) dv and pi′(v) = p − c(v) equation
(16) can be also expressed as
max
st
E
[ T∑
t=1
ρt−1
(
pi(xt)− pi(st)
)]
.
To demonstrate that the optimal management approach is of the constant es-
capement type analogous to Reed (1979) we solve the Bellman equation by back-
ward induction:
Jn(xT−(n−1)) = max
sT−(n−1)
{(
pi(xT−(n−1)) − pi(sT−(n−1))
)
+ ρE
[
Jn−1
(
xT−n
)]}
, (18)
where the operator E denotes the expectation over the probability distribution of
the random variable zt. First we solve the problem for the last period T :
J1(xT ) = max
sT
[pi(xT )− pi(s∞)],
where sT is assumed to be the escapement level corresponding to the open-access
fishery s∞. Now we consider the problem for the penultimate period:
J2(xT−1) = max
ST−1
{(
pi(xT−1)− pi(sT−1)
)
+ ρE
[
pi(xT )− pi(s∞)
]}
,
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where s∞ is a constant and xT = g(sT−1) + ztr(sT−1), such that the previous
equation can be written as
J2(xT−1) = max
ST−1
{(
pi(xT−1)− pi(sT−1)
)
+ ρE
[
pi
(
g(sT−1) + ztr(sT−1)
)]}
+ const. (19)
Under the assumptions on the curvature properties of g(·), r(·) and c(·), this
problem has a unique maximum at an escapement level which we denote by s∗.
This escapement level is optimal if the stock at the beginning of the period (xt)
is greater than s∗. The optimal policy is a most rapid approach strategy to s∗.
This can be validated by inserting s∗ in J2(xT−1) and substituting the result in
J3(xT−2):
J2(xT−1) =
(
pi(xT−1)− pi(s∗)
)
+ ρE
[
pi
(
g(s∗) + ztr(s∗)
)]
+ const.
Since s∗ is constant, in particular note, that s∗ is independent of stock, xt, the
function can be rewritten as
J2(xT−1) = pi(xT−1) + const.
Now we consider J3(xT−2):
J3(xT−2) = max
ST−2
{(
pi(xT−2)− pi(sT−2)
)
+ ρE
[
J2(xT−1)
]}
. (20)
Inserting J2(xT−1) = pi(xT−1) + const yields
J3(xT−2) = max
ST−2
{(
pi(xT−2)− pi(sT−2)
)
+ ρE
[
pi
(
g(sT−2) + ztr(sT−2)
)]}
+ const. (21)
Since J3(xT−2) is equivalent to J2(xT−1) in (19) except for the constant the constant
escapement strategy s∗ is also valid for the period T − 2. By complete induction
the same holds for all periods.
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B Optimal Escapement Level
We now consider the optimal escapement level in the stochastic growth model. By
differentiating equation (18) with respect to sT−(n−1) we get the following condition:
pi′(s∗) = ρE
[
pi′
(
g(s∗) + zt r(s∗)
)(
g′(s∗) + zt r′(s∗)
)]
.
Substituting p− c(v) for pi′(v) and rearranging we get
p− c(s∗) = ρ g′(s∗)
(
p− E
[
c
(
g(s∗) + zt r(s∗)
)])
+ ρ r′(s∗)
(
p− E
[
zt c
(
g(s∗) + z r(s∗)
)])
. (22)
C Increasing uncertainty when survival is proportional to
recruitment
Inserting the cost function c(x˜) = ζ x˜−χ in equation (9) and rearranging we get
p− c(s∗) = ρf ′(s∗)
(
p− ζ
f(s∗)χ
Ez˜[z˜
1−χ]
)
.
With z˜ as a lognormally-distributed random variable the expectation can be cal-
culated as
Ez˜[z˜
1−χ] =
∫ ∞
0
z˜1−χ
1
z˜
√
2pis2t
exp
(
−(ln z −mz˜)
2
2s2t
)
dz.
With µz˜ = 1, the parameters are mz˜ = −12 ln
(
1 + σ2z˜
)
and s2z˜ = ln
(
1 + σ2z˜
)
.
Substituting ln(z) = q we get
Ez˜[z˜
1−χ] =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
(1− χ)q) 1√
2pis2t
exp
(
−(q −mz˜)
2
2s2t
)
dq,
which yields
Ez˜[z˜
1−χ] =
(
1 + σ2z˜
)χ(1−χ)
2
.
For χ ∈ (0, 1) the expectation decreases with increasing variance σ2. This results
in lower expected costs and higher expected profits and gives thus an incentive to
choose a higher escapement level.
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D Optimal escapement with both mortality and recruit-
ment stochastic
In this appendix we briefly consider the case where both processes, survival and
recruitment, are stochastic, i.e. we replace (1) by
xt+1 = wt g(st) + zt r(st), (23)
with two i.i.d. random variables wt and zt. The condition for the optimal escape-
ment level (6) under risk-neutrality then generalizes to
p− c(s∗) = ρ g′(s∗)
[
p− Ew,z
[
wt c
(
wt g(s
∗) + zt r(s∗)
)]]
+ ρ r′(s∗)
[
p− Ew,z
[
zt c
(
wtg(s
∗) + z r(s∗)
)]]
. (24)
If wt and zt are perfectly correlated, this model is equivalent to Reed’s (1979)
model, and the optimal escapement level under uncertainty is unambiguously
larger than in the deterministic case. If wt and zt are not perfectly correlated, the
effect of uncertainty on the optimal escapement level is ambiguous. This holds in
particular for the case where wt and zt are independent. To show this, we consider
the example of the Baltic Cod fishery considered in Section 4. The only modifi-
cation is that we assume that the two random variables zt ∝ LOGN(1, σ2z) and
wt ∝ LOGN(1, σ2w) are independently distributed with σ2w ≥ 0. For σ2z = σ2w = 0,
we obtain s¯∗ = 0.904 million tons (see Section 4). For the example considered
here, we set σ2z = 0.5, slightly higher than the empirical value. For σw = 0.1, we
get s∗ = 0.901 < s¯∗. For σw = 0.5, we get s∗ = 0.911 > s¯∗. Thus, the effect of
uncertainty is ambiguous.
E Optimal escapement with risk aversion
Using c(x˜) ≡ 0, the biomass growth equation (8) with the specification (11),
u(Π) = ν Π1−ϑ/(1 − ϑ), and φ = ϑ in (4), the first-order condition for optimal
escapement becomes
ν p1−ϑ
(x− s)ϑ = ρE
[
d
ds
J
(
z
(
α s1−ϑ + αβ1−ϑ
) 1
1−ϑ
)]
(25)
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Guessing s = δ x with some δ > 0 and (13) for the value function, condition (25)
becomes
ν p1−ϑ
((1− δ)x)ϑ = ρψ1E
[
z1−ϑ
]
α (δ x)−ϑ (26)
⇔ ν p1−ϑ
(
δ
1− δ
)ϑ
= ραE
[
z1−ϑ
]
ψ1 (27)
The Bellman-equation reads
J(x) =
ν p1−ϑ
1− ϑ ((1− δ)x)
1−ϑ + ρE [J(z f(δ x))]
Using the guess (13) again, we obtain
ψ1
1− ϑ x
1−ϑ+ψ2 =
ν p1−ϑ
1− ϑ ((1− δ)x)
1−ϑ+ρE
[
ψ1
1− ϑ z
1−ϑ (α (δ x)1−ϑ + αβ1−ϑ)+ ψ2]
ψ1 = ν p
1−ϑ (1− δ)1−ϑ + ρE[z1−ϑ]α δ1−ϑ ψ1 (28)
ψ2 =
ρ
1− ρ E[z
1−ϑ]αβ1−ϑ ψ1 (29)
Using (28) in (27), we obtain (14).
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We analyze how the optimal harvest-control rule (HCR) for a ﬁshery depends on
the degrees of risk aversion of ﬁshermen and consumers of ﬁsh. We derive analytical
solutions for a class of speciﬁc discrete-time models, and numerical results in an
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1 Introduction
Growth and reproduction of a ﬁsh stock are strongly inﬂuenced by variable en-
vironmental conditions like oxygen concentration, salinity and temperature such
that stock biomass and harvest quantities are hard to predict. This is of particu-
lar relevance for risk averse ﬁshermen who prefer smoothed intertemporal income
and for risk averse consumers who want a steady supply of ﬁsh. We analyze how
the optimal harvest-control rule (HCR) for a ﬁshery depends on the degrees of
risk-aversion of ﬁshermen and consumers of ﬁsh. Under uncertainty, an optimal
management plan has to be speciﬁed in form of a harvest-control rule, or feedback
policy, that speciﬁes the harvest quantity as a function of the current stock size.
This is also the approach taken for ﬁsheries management plans (Froese et al. 2011).
In this paper we determine the optimal HCR for diﬀerent degrees of risk aver-
sion among the stakeholders and apply our analysis to the Eastern Baltic cod
ﬁshery. There is a broad literature in resource economics on optimal ﬁshery man-
agement under uncertain stock growth. However, most studies assume risk neutral
ﬁshermen and consumers. Reed (1979) shows that for risk neutral agents optimal
management of a ﬁsh stock is characterized by a constant escapement policy, i.e.
a constant size of the ﬁsh stock that remains in the sea after ﬁshing. The subse-
quent literature has reﬁned this work by adding multiple uncertainties (Clark and
Kirkwood 1986, Sethi et al. 2005), costly capital adjustments (Singh et al. 2006),
the choice of the regulatory instrument (Weitzman 2002), the spatial structure
of the resource (Costello and Polasky 2008) and management with environmental
prediction (Costello et al. 2001).
Only a few studies examine optimal feedback policies in a framework with risk
aversion. Pindyck (1984) studies the management of renewable resources under
uncertainty in continuous time, assuming a downward sloping demand function,
which can be interpreted as reﬂecting risk-aversion of consumers. He oﬀers analyt-
36
ical solutions for linear HCR and steady-state probability distributions for three
special cases. Kapaun and Quaas (2013) examine how environmental uncertainty
aﬀects the optimal stock size and ﬁnd that the optimal stock size could be higher or
lower compared to the deterministic setting, depending, among other parameters,
on the ﬁshermen's degree of risk aversion. Using a similar model, Antoniadou et al.
(2013) study the eﬀects of risk aversion in a setting where several resource man-
agers exploit a common-property resource and identify cases where risk reduces or
increases the commons problem. The eﬀect of risk aversion on the (maximum) ex-
pected sustainable yield (MESY) in a continuous-time model is studied by Ewald
and Wang (2010). They model risk aversion in three diﬀerent ways: 1) by in-
cluding the variance as a penalty function, 2) by maximizing ESY under variance
constraint or 3) by minimizing variance of the equilibrium distribution under an
expectation constraint. In all cases they found that ﬁsheries are in general willing
to accept a lower expected sustainable yield in turn for a lower level of risk.
In this paper we extend this literature by characterizing how the optimal feed-
back policy (or: harvest-control rule) depends on the degrees of risk aversion of the
relevant stakeholder groups, i.e. consumers and ﬁshermen. We determine and com-
pare the optimal harvest-control rules depending on the respective degrees of risk
aversion. As we consider a stochastic stock growth model, harvest and/or stock
biomass will change over time, i.e. over the realization of the random variable.
To investigate these eﬀects, we analyze the steady state probability distributions,
in particular mean and standard deviation of escapement, stock, and harvest un-
der diﬀerent HCR. Under the optimal HCR for risk neutral stakeholders, stock
biomass at the end of the ﬁshing period, the escapement, will not change, such
that all ﬂuctuations will be absorbed by the annual harvest quantity. Under risk
aversion both the escapement level and the harvest will ﬂuctuate, and the higher
the degree of risk aversion, the more the optimal HCR will shift uncertainty from
harvest to the stock. Mean and standard deviation of harvest are monotonically
decreasing with the degree of risk aversion, while the coeﬃcient of variation of the
resource stock will monotonically increase. The eﬀect of risk aversion on mean
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values of the resource stock is ambiguous. For lower degrees of risk aversion mean
stock will decrease and will be lower than in the case with risk-neutral stakehold-
ers; for suﬃciently high degrees of risk aversion mean stock size will increase and
will be higher than under risk neutrality.
The paper is structured as follows: In the following section we set up the
stochastic ﬁshery model with risk-averse stakeholders and apply it to the Baltic
cod ﬁshery in section 3. In section 4 we determine the optimal HCR analytically for
a few special cases and numerically in the example of the Baltic cod and compare
them with respect to their allocation of risk. We discuss our results in section 5.
2 Stochastic ﬁshery model with risk-averse stake-
holders
We consider a simple biomass model with stochastic stock growth in discrete time,
where we allow the demand function to be downward sloping, and allow for risk
aversion of ﬁshermen against income ﬂuctuations between years.1 The growth of
biomass xt from time step t to t+ 1 is described by the equation
xt+1 = zt f(st), (1)
where st denotes the escapement, i.e. the biomass that remains in the ecosystem
after harvest ht, such that st = xt − ht. The period between t and t+ 1 is divided
into two parts. In the ﬁrst part harvesting takes place. In the second part the
remaining ﬁsh biomass, i.e. the escapement, reproduces itself. The reproduction
process is supposed to be sensitive to changing environmental conditions which are
represented by the i.i.d. random variable zt with z > 0 and mean equal to one.
We assume that the ﬁshery manager could observe the stock at the beginning of
the period (xt) with certainty. But when deciding about the optimal harvest in
period t and thus about the optimal escapement level st, the ﬁshery manager does
1McGough et al. (2009) study a similar model, and derive optimal HCRs by linearizing the
Euler equation in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state.
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Figure 1: Illustrative examples for the expected biomass growth function (2).
not know how the ﬁsh stock will grow and is thus uncertain about stock biomass
at the beginning of the following period xt+1.
Expected biomass growth is described by the growth function f(st), which is
assumed to be increasing and concave, f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. We will use the following
speciﬁcation (Antoniadou et al. 2013, Kapaun and Quaas 2013):
f(s) =
(
α s1−φ + (1− α) β1−φ) 11−φ , (2)
with
f ′(s) = α
(
α + (1− α) sφ−1 β1−φ) φ1−φ > 0
f ′′(s) = −α (1− α)φ sφ−2 β1−φ (α + (1− α) sφ−1 β1−φ) φ1−φ−1 < 0
The class of biomass growth functions contains, for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of φ,
a number of widely used speciﬁcations. For φ > 1, it follows that f(0) = 0 and
f ′(0) = α
1
1−φ is bounded for s → 0, and f(s) s→∞−→ (1 − α) 11−φ β is also bounded.
For φ < 1, by contrast, f(0) = (1−α) 11−φ β > 0, f ′(s) s→0−−→∞, and f ′(s) s→∞−−−→∞.
Two special cases of (2) are particularly well-known: For φ = 2, we obtain the
Beverton-Holt (1957) function fi(s) = s/(α+(1−α)/β s). For φ = 1, (2) becomes
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the iso-elastic function fi(s) = β
1−α sα, also known as the Cushing (1971) stock-
recruitment function in ﬁsheries, and used in resource economics, among others,
by Levhari and Mirman (1980).
Harvesting takes place according to a generalized Schaefer production function
for the instantaneous harvest rate h˙ within the ﬁshing season, h˙ = q(x˜)Et x˜,
where q(x˜) is the catchability of the ﬁsh stock. We use Et to denote the eﬀort of
harvesting ﬁsh and x˜ to denote the stock, such that x˜ = xt at the beginning of
year t's ﬁshing season and x˜ = st at the end (Reed 1979, Clark 1990). Harvesting
costs C are proportional to eﬀort, C = ζ Et, with constant marginal costs ζ. The
unit cost function of harvesting ﬁsh thus is c(x˜) = ζ/(q(x˜) x˜). We use the common
speciﬁcation of the harvesting cost function c(x˜) = η x˜−χ with χ ∈ (0, 1], which
implies that unit harvesting cost are decreasing and convex in the stock size, i.e.
c′ < 0 and c′′ > 0.
During the harvesting season each ﬁsh caught reduces the stock by one unit.
Using pt to denote the market price of ﬁsh in year t, annual proﬁt pit is obtained
by integrating the ﬂow of proﬁts over the whole ﬁshing season
pit =
∫ xt
st
(pt − c(x˜)) dx˜ = pt ht − η
1− χ
(
x1−χt − s1−χt
)
. (3)
The limit for χ→ 1 exists and is given by pit = p1 ht − η ln(xt/st).
The representative ﬁsherman is risk-averse, captured by an instantaneous util-
ity function with constant relative risk aversion θ,
v(pit) =
pi1−θt − 1
1− θ . (4)
For θ → 1, the representative ﬁsherman's utility function is v(pit) = ln(pit).
For the representative consumer we assume a quasi-linear utility function U(y, h) =
y − u(h), where y is consumption of a numeraire (income), and u(h) is utility of
ﬁsh consumption. We will use the speciﬁcation
u(h) =
a h1−
1−  , (5)
with a > 0 and  > 0. This utility gives rise to the iso-elastic inverse demand
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function
p(ht) = a h
−
t . (6)
We assume that  < 1, which means that revenues p(ht)ht are strictly increasing
with ﬁsh supply (which we regard to be a meaningful restriction), and furthermore
guarantees u(ht) > 0.
There are two equivalent ways of formulating the ﬁshery manager's optimiza-
tion problem. One is to maximize the present value of utility for the risk-averse
ﬁshermen, taking the market price of ﬁsh as given, and then using the inverse
demand function (6) in the ﬁrst-order condition that determines optimal harvest
at a given stock size. The alternative, equivalent approach is to solve the following
maximization problem:
max
{
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
ρt−1v
(
u(h)−
∫ xt
st
c(x˜) dx˜
)]}
subject to (1) (7)
where the operator E denotes the expectation over probability distribution of the
random process {zt} and ρ is the discount factor ρ = 1/(1+ r), where r > 0 is the
market interest rate.
Using J(x) to denote the value function for optimization problem (7), the
Bellman-equation reads
J(x) = max
s
{
v
(
u(x− s)−
∫ x
s
c(x˜) dx˜
)
+ ρE [J(z f(s))]
}
. (8)
3 The Eastern Baltic cod ﬁshery
The Baltic cod is one of the main commercial species in the Baltic Sea. Since the
water in the Baltic Sea is brackish, it is a marginal area for cod. The ﬁsh population
depends on ﬂuctuating fresh water inﬂows from the North Sea to increase the
salinity level to a degree where their eggs can hatch (Röckmann et al. 2007).
Accordingly, the development of the Baltic cod is highly uncertain and represents
a useful example for the stochastic stock growth model. The Baltic cod stock
experienced a sharp decrease in the total stock biomass by the early 1990s, resulting
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from deterioration in the environmental conditions and increasing ﬁshing pressure
(ICES 2012). In 2007 the EU multiannual management plan was set up which
resulted in a slight recovery of the ﬁsh stock in the last years.
3.1 Historical and current HCR for Eastern Baltic cod
The current harvest-control rule for the Eastern Baltic cod ﬁshery ﬁxes a constant
ﬁshing mortality, i.e. the total allowable catch (TAC) is determined as a constant
fraction of the stock size. This harvest-control rule is part of the multiannual
plan for the cod in the Baltic Sea (European Commission 2007), set up by the
European Union in 2007. The plan should ensure that Baltic cod stocks can be
exploited under sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions. It fur-
ther states that "[...] the Eastern stock must be rebuilt to safe biological limits
and [...] levels must be ensured at which their full reproductive capacity is main-
tained and the highest long-term yields can be reached" (European Commission
2007, preamble, item 6). With other words, the multiannual plan should ensure a
maximum sustainable yield (MSY). To realize this goal the ﬁshing mortality rates
should be gradually reduced and maintained at levels no lower than 0.3 on ages
4 to 7 for the Eastern Baltic cod stock in ICES area 25-32. Gradual reduction
means a 10 % reduction of the previous year's ﬁshing mortality rate. According
to scientiﬁc advice the TAC is adopted that is the higher of the one applying the
10% reduction rule and the one resulting from the ﬁshing mortality rate of 0.3.
Should both result in a TAC that deviates by more than 15% in absolute value
from the TAC of the preceding year, the TAC is adopted which is 15% higher or
lower than the previous year's TAC. Thus, the multiannual management plan is
not only aiming at the MSY but also at smoothed harvests over time. Negotiated
with all stakeholders including ﬁshermen's associations and ﬁshing industries, the
EU management plan is indeed addressed to risk averse stakeholders.
It is worth to have a look on the past ﬁshing mortalities. Figure 2 shows
the observed harvest and stock sizes for the period before the introduction of the
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Figure 2: EU ﬁshery policy and past ﬁshery development for Eastern Baltic cod in
ICES area 25-32. Open circles indicate data points before the implementation of
the management plan (1966-2006), ﬁlled circles indicate data from 2007 onwards
(ICES 2012).
management plan (1966 to 2007; white dots) and since the management plan is
in place (2008 to 2012; black dots). To derive the implicit HCR for the years
1966-2007, i.e. before the multiannual plan was set up, we assumed an iso-elastic
harvest curve H = αxβ and estimated the ln(H) = ln(α) + β ln(x) by means of
ordinary least squares. We get α = 0.33 with the conﬁdence interval [0.28 0.39]
and β = 0.87 with the conﬁdence interval [0.73 0.99], the resulting curve is shown
as the dashed line in Figure 2. Thus the implicit HCR before the management
plan was a concave function in the ﬁsh stock. Contrary, the new HCR with a
constant ﬁshing mortality rate of 0.3 is linear in ﬁsh stock (shown as the dotted
line in Figure 2). It is obvious that harvest has been higher in the years 1966 to
2007 than under the current management strategy.
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3.2 Estimation of model parameter values
For the estimation of the parameters of the biological growth function we use
ICES (2012) assessment data for the Eastern Baltic cod in the ICES area 25-
32 (years 1966 to 2012) for total biomass xt, and harvest ht, which is the sum
of landings and discards, to calculate escapement st = xt − ht. We assume a
stochastic Beverton-Holt (1957) growth function f(st) = zt
s
α+ 1−α
β
s
, i.e. we specify
φ = 2. For the numerical application, we further assume that the random variable
zt capturing environmental uncertainty is log-normally distributed. We take as
exogenously given the estimate for the carrying capacity from Froese and Quaas
(2011), which is K = 2 million tons. We therefore set β = K and only estimate
α. We econometrically estimate the parameter value α for the biomass growth
function as well as the standard deviation of zt by means of nonlinear least square
regression for the model
Xt+1 = log
(
s
α + 1−α
K
s
)
+ ut, (9)
assuming that ut = log(zt) is an independently and identically normally distributed
error term. We obtain α = 0.53 with 95% conﬁdence interval (0.50; 0.56) and
σu = 0.14.
For estimating the cost function (cf. equation 3) we use data on eﬀort as days
at sea for the Danish ﬂeet2 from Fiskeridirektoratet (2008) and Fiskeriregnskab-
sstatistik (2007) as well as ICES (2012) data for total biomass and the escapement
calculated for the stock growth function. Using again the Levenberg-Marquardt
algorithm for nonlinear least square we obtain q0 = 5.16 and χ = 0.95. For prices
and unit eﬀort costs ζ we use the estimates from Quaas et al. (2012). We get a
unit harvesting cost parameter η = 0.13 billion Euros per million days at sea.
With regard to the elasticity of marginal utility, we make two alternative
assumptions, 0 = 0 for risk-neutral consumers and for risk-averse consumers
1 = 0.23, which is the elasticity of the inverse demand for Baltic cod estimated by
2We assume that the Danish cost structure is representative for the whole Eastern Baltic cod
ﬁshery.
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Nielsen (2006). To determine a0 for risk neutral consumers and a1 for risk averse
consumers we again take Danish prices used for the estimation of the cost function.
We then get the average price parameters a0 = 1.37 and a1 = 2.54, measured in
billion Euros per million tons.3
To summarize we have the following optimization problem:
max
st
pit = E
[ T∑
t=1
ρt−1
1
1− θ
(
ai
1− i h
1−i −
∫ st
xt
0.13
x˜0.95
dx˜
)1−θ]
(10)
s.t. xt+1 = zt
s
0.53 + 1−0.53
2
s
where i = 0, 1 with a0 = 1.37 if 0 = 0 and a1 = 2.54 if 1 = 0.23, and ρ = 1/(1+r)
is the discount factor for a discount rate r.
For the preference parameters, the discount rate r and the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion θ, we use experimental observations from Andersen et al. (2008) who
jointly elicit risk and time preferences in controlled experiments with subjects in
Denmark4. The resulting values we use are r = 0.1 and θ = 0.74 (Andersen et al.
2008, Table III). Although the estimated risk preference is not directly related to
ﬁshermen, it could be used as an upper bound for the ﬁshermen's degree of risk
aversion. Fishermen are likely less risk averse than the average Danish population,
since a high risk sector as the ﬁshery will only attract those individuals who are
willing to accept the risk. In addition we also consider the case of risk neutral
ﬁshermen, i.e.we set θ = 0.
4 Optimal harvest-control rules
In this section we derive the optimal harvest-control rules for three diﬀerent sce-
narios: 1) consumers and ﬁshermen are risk neutral, 2) only the ﬁshermen are risk
averse and 3) consumers and ﬁshermen are both risk averse.
3We use the exchange rate of 7.45 between Danish crowns and euros.
4Again, we assume that ﬁndings for Denmark are representative for the whole Eastern Baltic
cod ﬁshery.
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Figure 3: Optimal harvest-control rules for risk-neutral and for risk-averse stake-
holders; and management plan for Eastern Baltic cod.
4.1 Analytical results
First we derive analytical results in a few special cases, stated in results 1 to 3:
Result 1. If all stakeholders are risk neutral (θ =  = 0), the optimal harvest-
control rule is (weakly) convex.
Proof: The optimal HCR under risk neutrality is a constant escapement policy,
pictured as the dash-dotted line in Figure 3. Precisely, the corresponding HCR is
hˆ(x) = min(0, x− s∗) (see Reed 1979). 
As long as the stock at the beginning of the period is lower than the optimal
escapement level s∗ the optimal feedback solution sˆ(x) equals the stock level and
there is no harvesting at all, hˆ(x) = 0. When the stock level at the beginning of
the period is higher than the optimal escapement level s∗ the excess is harvested
immediately, i.e. until the end of the ﬁshing season, hˆ(x) = x − s∗. Above
the threshold x = s∗ harvest therefore increases with the stock level to keep the
escapement level constant. A consequence of the constant escapement policy is
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that annual harvest could ﬂuctuate heavily depending on the realization of the
random variable. Under adverse environmental conditions harvest might be zero,
under favorable environmental conditions harvest might be very high.
Result 2. For risk-neutral consumers ( = 0), and stock-independent harvesting
costs (χ = 0), the optimal harvest-control rule is linear if θ = φ.
Proof: Kapaun and Quaas (2013) show that under the given assumptions the
value function is J(x) = ψ1 x
1−φ/(1− φ) + ψ2 with some constants ψ1 > 0 and ψ2
and that the optimal harvest-control rule is sˆ(x) = κx ⇐⇒ hˆ(x) = (1 − κ)x,
where κ =
(
ραE
[
z1−φ
]) 1
φ . 
A similar closed-form solution can be also obtained in another special case of
the model, where ﬁshermen are assumed to be risk neutral, i.e. θ = 0, and under
the additional assumption that φ =  = χ. In Appendix A we show that for
the optimal policy rule for this model is also sˆ(x) = κx, where κ is given as the
solution of the equation
(1− κ)φ 1− ραE[z
1−φ]
κφ − ραE[z1−φ] =
a
η
. (11)
Thus we have the following result.
Result 3. For risk-neutral ﬁshermen (θ = 0), the optimal harvest-control rule is
linear if  = χ = φ.
The optimal policy in both special cases considered in Results 2 and 3 is char-
acterized by a constant ﬁshing mortality rate, i.e. a constant fraction of the ﬁsh
stock will be harvested in every period. The optimal feedback curve is an increas-
ing function of the stock level. In contrast to the constant escapement policy,
which is optimal for risk-neutral stakeholders, harvest with risk-averse stakehold-
ers is positive even for low stock levels. For high stock levels the harvest under
a constant ﬁshing mortality rate is lower than under a constant escapement pol-
icy. Given the intertemporal ﬂuctuations of the stock growth and thus ﬂuctuating
stock levels at the beginning of the ﬁshing period a constant ﬁshing mortality rate
results in smoothed harvest quantities over time.
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The assumptions necessary for the analytical solutions are quite restrictive,
and not in line with the empirical speciﬁcation of the model parameters (see Sec-
tion 3.2). In the following section we study optimal harvest-control rules numeri-
cally by allowing for diﬀerent parameter constellations.
4.2 Numerical results for Eastern Baltic cod
Under risk aversion among ﬁshermen and consumers the problem is non-linear in
harvest and can only be solved numerically. To get a closed-loop solution for the
optimal escapement level depending on the observed biomass level sˆ(x), which
can be easily transformed into an optimal harvest-control rule hˆ(x) = x − sˆ(x),
we thus approximate the Bellman-equation (8) applying the collocation method
(Miranda and Fackler 2002), where the value function J(x) is approximated by a
ﬁnite linear combination of Chebychev polynomials. We use 77 collocation nodes
on the interval x ∈ [0.1, 3.9] million tonnes.5
Based on our analytical solutions in section 4.1 we can examine, how the opti-
mal HCR will change with changing coeﬃcients of risk aversion.
First we consider the conditions that lead to a linear optimal HCR (speciﬁed in
Results 2 and 3) and ask how the shape of the optimal HCR changes if stakeholders
are more or less risk averse than speciﬁed by the respective conditions. In Result 2
we assumed risk-neutral consumers, and showed that the optimal HCR is linear if
the risk-aversion coeﬃcient of ﬁshermen (θ) coincides with the parameter φ of the
biomass growth function. To numerically analyze how the shape of the optimal
HCR changes when deviating from this assumption, we consider the speciﬁcation
θ = φ = 2 as the benchmark case. this means that we consider the Beverton-Holt
speciﬁcation for the biomass growth function (see Section 3.2). We then compare
the resulting optimal HCR with the optimal HCR we obtain for values of θ that
are slightly higher or lower than θ = 2. We ﬁnd that the optimal HCR is convex
(concave) for values slightly below 2 (above 2). Figure 4 shows the diﬀerence in
5The optimization routines were implemented in Matlab. All programming codes will be
made available as online supporting material.
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Figure 4: Convex and concave harvest-control rules.
optimal harvest between the benchmark case θ = 2 and for values slightly above
(θ = 2.05) and below (θ = 1.95). Under a convex (concave) HCR we observe
lower (higher) harvest for lower stock levels and higher (lower) harvest for higher
stock levels relative to the constant ﬁshing mortality rate for θ = 2. Thus, under
a convex HCR harvest is less smoothed over time than under a concave HCR.
We now proceed by determining the optimal HCR for the Baltic cod ﬁshery
given that both stakeholders are risk averse, ﬁshermen with a coeﬃcient of risk
aversion of θ = 0.74 and consumers with  = 0.23 (cf. Section 3.2). The resulting
optimal HCR is convex and shown as the solid curve in Figure 3. We see that for
risk averse stakeholders, the optimal harvest as well as the optimal escapement
monotonically increase with stock biomass. For low biomass levels we have higher
harvest (lower escapement levels) under risk aversion than under risk neutrality.
But for high biomass levels we observe optimal harvest levels (optimal escapement
levels) which are below (above) those under risk neutrality. The feedback solution
for risk averse stakeholders results in smoothed harvest. When the ﬁsh stock at
the beginning of the period is low, as a result of adverse environmental conditions,
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harvest is not zero but positive. When the stock at the beginning of the period is
high, a result of favorable environmental conditions, the optimal feedback solution
yields lower harvest than under the constant escapement policy. Therefore the
extreme harvest levels are eliminated and harvest over time is smoothed.
4.3 Risk allocation under optimal harvest-control rules
In the previous section we have found that the optimal HCR under risk aversion is
ﬂatter than for the case of risk-neutral stakeholders and thus will lead to smoothed
harvest over time, i.e. the risk of heavily ﬂuctuating harvest is dampened. In this
section we will focus on the question how the risk is allocated under diﬀerent HCR.
To analyze the risk allocation under the diﬀerent optimal HCR we numerically
examine the steady-state probability distributions of stock, escapement and har-
vest. For that sake, we consider a million simulations over a time period of 25
periods (after which we assume that the steady state is reached), starting at the
current (2012) stock level of 290.000 tons. Figure 5 shows the steady state dis-
tribution of stock, escapement and harvest for the year t = 25 for three diﬀerent
HCRs: 1) the optimal HCR for risk-neutral stakeholders, i.e. the constant escape-
ment policy, 2) the optimal HCR for risk averse stakeholders with θ = 0.74 and
 = 0.23 and 3) the HCR with a constant ﬁshing mortality F = 0.3 as speciﬁed in
the multiannual management plan.
First we consider the constant escapement policy for risk neutral stakeholder.
Here, the harvest quantities vary considerably around the mean harvest of 314,600
tons. The lowest observed harvest quantity is 0 tonnes, the highest 1,298,400
tonnes. The coeﬃcient of variation (CV) for harvest is 0.50. The escapement level
barely ﬂuctuates with a CV of only 0.01, while the stock level exhibits a coeﬃcient
of variation of 0.14.
When both stakeholders are risk averse the harvest varies between 83.600 and
971.500 tons around the mean harvest of 304,800 tons with a coeﬃcient of variation
(CV) of 0.25, which is considerably lower compared to 0.50 under the constant
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Figure 5: Histograms of the steady-state distributions of stock, escapement, and
harvest under the optimal HCR for risk-neutral stakeholders (top row); risk-averse
stakeholders (middle row); and the current management plan for Eastern Baltic
cod (bottom row).
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escapement policy. We also see that stock and escapement ﬂuctuates more under
risk aversion than under constant escapement policy. The CV for the escapement
increases from 0.01 under the constant escapement policy to 0.15 under the optimal
HCR for risk averse stakeholders. The increase in the variation for the stock is
relatively lower with 0.14 for the constant escapement policy and 0.18 for the case
of risk aversion. Thus, less ﬂuctuations in harvest are primarily compensated by
the escapement level at the end of the period and only second-tier by the stock
level at the beginning of the period. Hence, smoothed harvest go along with
strongly ﬂuctuating escapement levels. In other words, the risk is mainly shifted
from harvest to escapement.
For a deeper analysis of this eﬀect we examine the eﬀect of increasing degrees
of risk aversion on the mean and standard deviation of stock xt, escapement st and
harvest ht. We only vary risk aversion among ﬁshermen, keeping the risk aversion
of consumer constant at  = 0.23, since ﬁshermen have less possibilities to substi-
tute Baltic cod with other species and thus higher degrees of risk aversion are more
plausible. The results are plotted in Figure 6. As can be seen, mean harvest mono-
tonically decreases with increasing risk aversion among ﬁshermen. Simultaneously
the variation in harvest is also decreasing. On the contrary variation in stock and
escapement will monotonically increase with increasing risk aversion. The higher
the degree of risk aversion, the more the optimal HCR will shift uncertainty from
harvest to the stock.
The eﬀect of risk aversion on the stock and escapement is ambiguous. Under
low risk aversion, as in our example for values θ < 1, mean level for stock and
escapement are lower compared to the case of risk neutrality among ﬁshermen.
It is also lower than the mean levels for the case of risk-neutral stakeholders,
i.e. compared to the constant escapement policy. Relatively higher degrees of
risk aversion, in our example values of θ well above one, then lead to increasing
mean levels of stock and escapement, even compared to the constant escapement
policy. In our example of the Baltic cod ﬁshery with a moderate risk aversion
among ﬁshermen of θ = 0.74 we observe a lower mean stock size than in the case
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Figure 6: Mean and standard deviation of steady-state distributions for stock,
escapement, and harvest under optimal havest-control-rules for diﬀerent coeﬃcient
of risk-aversion of ﬁshermen risk-aversion.
of risk-neutral ﬁshermen and/or consumers. Thus, risk averse stakeholders are
willing to accept a lower mean harvest for less variations in harvest, even if it
comes to the expense of a lower mean level of the resource stock. This is in line
with the ﬁndings of Ewald and Wang (2010) who found lower expected sustainable
yield values under risk aversion, although in a static continuous-time model with
a stochastic diﬀerential equation of the Ito-type.
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed how the optimal harvest-control rule for a ﬁshery
under environmental uncertainty depends on the risk-aversion of stakeholders. We
have derived analytical results for a few special cases and quantitative results for
the Eastern Baltic cod ﬁshery.
We have shown that the optimal policy under risk aversion diﬀers considerably
from the common constant escapement policy under risk neutrality. In contrast
to constant escapement levels under risk neutrality we get increasing escapement
levels in the optimal feedback policy for risk averse agents resulting in monoton-
ically increasing harvest. We found that the optimal harvest-control rule will be
convex for relatively low degrees of risk aversion and will be concave for relatively
high degrees of risk aversion. A linear HCR will be optimal under some restrictive
assumptions with respect to the cost structure, the stock growth function and the
coeﬃcients of risk aversion of the stakeholders.
Considering intertemporal ﬂuctuations we found that the constant escapement
policy for risk neutral agents results in strong ﬂuctuations of harvest whereas we
observe smoothed harvest and strongly ﬂuctuating escapement under an optimal
policy for risk averse agents. The higher the degree of risk aversion, the more
the optimal HCR will shift uncertainty from harvest to the stock. The intuitive
reason is that the optimal HCR makes use of the natural insurance function of
the ecosystem (Quaas and Baumgärtner 2008). At the same time risk aversion
results in a lower mean harvest, whereas the eﬀect on the mean resource stock
is ambiguous. Under moderate degrees of risk aversion we observe a lower mean
resource stock compared to the case of risk neutrality. Only relatively high degrees
of risk aversion ensure a more conservative resource management.
In section 4.1 we have shown that a constant ﬁshing mortality rate would be
optimal in a special case when demand is perfectly elastic, harvesting costs are
stock independent and the ﬁshermen have a coeﬃcient of risk aversion equal to
the elasticity parameter φ of the biomass growth function. If the stock growth
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follows a Beverton-Holt function, i.e. φ = 2, and the degree of risk aversion would
be θ = 2, the optimal HCR hˆ(x) =
(
1− (ραE[z1−φ]) 1φ) x would yield F = 0.36,
which is very similar to the constant ﬁshing mortality rate of FEU = 0.3 as set up
by the EU ﬁshery management plan.
However, experimental evidence shows that the degree of risk aversion is much
smaller than 2, and more likely to be about θ = 0.74. Using additionally an
elasticity of the inverse demand function for cod of  = 0.23, we have found that the
optimal HCR for Baltic cod is convex, and thus diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the current
and historical HCR for that ﬁshery. In particular for the prevailing, relatively small
stock sizes, optimal harvest would be much lower, and stock rebuilding would be
much faster, than under the current multiannual management plan for the Baltic
cod.
Appendix
A Optimal HCR with risk-averse consumers
Guessing the value function J(x) = ψ1 x
1−φ/(1− φ) + ψ2 with some constants ψ1
and ψ2, the ﬁrst order condition of the optimization problem on the right-hand
side of the Bellman equation (8) can be written as
a
(x− s)φ −
η
sφ
= ρψ1E[z
1−φ]
α
sφ
(12)
Now guessing sˆ(x) = κx with some κ > 0 we obtain
a
(1− κ)φ −
η
κφ
= ρψ1E[z
1−φ]
α
κφ
(13)
Using J(x) = ψ1 x
1−φ/(1 − φ) + ψ2 and sˆ(x) = κx in the Bellman equation (8),
we obtain
ψ1
x1−φ
1− φ + ψ2 = a
(x (1− κ))1−φ
1− φ −
η
1− φ x
1−φ (1− κ1−φ)
+ ρE
[
ψ1
1− φ z
1−φ (α (κx)1−φ + (1− α) β1−φ)+ ψ2] (14)
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By equating coeﬃcients, we obtain
ψ1 = a (1− κ)1−φ − η
(
1− κ1−φ)+ ψ1 ρE [z1−φ] ακ1−φ (15)
=
a
(1− κ)φ − η − κ
(
a
(1− κ)φ −
η
κφ
− ρψ1E[z1−φ] α
κφ
)
(16)
Using this in (13) leads to (1− κ)φ 1−ραE[z1−φ]
κφ−ραE[z1−φ] =
a
η
.
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Abstract.
In this paper I examine effects of ocean acidification on the optimal fishery man-
agement, in particular for the example of the Norwegian coastal cod. I summarize
recent biological studies on the effects of decreasing pH-values on different fish
species in the North Atlantic and demonstrate how these findings could be scaled
from the physiological level to population processes like the stock-recruitment rela-
tionship. Applying an age-structured fishery model to the Norwegian coastal cod
fishery I find that stock biomass and harvest possibilities will decrease with in-
creasing ocean acidification. While the detrimental consequences will be moderate
under predicted pH-values for the year 2300, an extreme upwelling scenario will
have severe effects on stock and harvest, in particular it destabilizes the system
and fosters pulse fishing. My results are meant as a first step towards including ex-
perimental data on biological effects of ocean acidification into ecological-economic
models. Further research will be needed, in particular on the ecosystem level, to
get reliable results as a basis for adaptive fishery management.
Keywords: fisheries, fishery economics, ocean acidification, Norwegian coastal
cod
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1 Introduction
Ocean acidification, caused by rising anthropogenic CO2 emissions, is supposed
to influence the marine ecosystem by decreasing the pH-value and changing the
chemical composition of seawater. Global surface pH has already decreased by
more than 0.1 units since preindustrial times and might decrease by up to 0.4
additional units by 2100 (Caldeira and Wicket, 2003; Caldeira and Wicket, 2005;
Denman et al., 2011). In the last years oceanographers examined possible effects
of ocean acidification on marine flora and fauna. Decreasing ocean pH, accom-
panied by decreasing carbonate ion concentration and calcium carbonate mineral
saturation, will negatively effect growth of calcium carbonate shells and skeletons
by many marine plants and animals (Cooley and Doney, 2009). Although ocean
acidification will primarily effect calcifying organisms, some fish species could also
be sensitive to decreasing ocean pH-values. In particular early life history stages in
fish development, like eggs and larvae, are believed to be vulnerable against acidic
conditions as they lack specialized internal pH regulatory mechanisms (Frommel et
al., 2012a). Thus, by deteriorating recruitment conditions for the fish stock ocean
acidification could induce declines in fishing possibilities. In this article I examine
how optimal fishery management should change with rising ocean acidification.
Research on the effects of ocean acidification to fisheries management is a new
field. To my knowledge there is no study yet, which determines the optimal fishery
management under progressive ocean acidification. This may be due to the still
very limited knowledge about the consequences of decreasing pH-values on the
physiology of different fish species. Some recent studies imply detrimental effects
of ocean acidification on the early-life stages of certain fish species, but detailed
long-term studies are still missing.
More is known about the effects on calcifying organism, like mollusks and crus-
taceans. There are already a few articles dealing with the economic consequences
for commercial fisheries, in particular the study of Cooley and Doney (2009) about
the commercial US fisheries for mollusks. In US fisheries mollusks count for 19%
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of the total ex-vessel value. Another 30% result from crustaceans and 24% from
fish that prey directly on calcifiers. “To provide a starting point for ocean acidifi-
cation’s impact on mollusks,... [they] assume a simple one-to-one correspondence
between reduced calcification for a particular atmospheric CO2 level and reduced
commercial mollusk harvests” (Cooley and Doney, 2009). By doing so they predict
a 6%-25% decrease in harvest accompany 0.1-0.2-unit pH decrease over 50 years,
resulting in net present value loss of $ 1.7-10 billion through mid-century. Narita
et al. (2012) extend this analysis for mollusks to a partial equilibrium consid-
eration. They in turn yield annual losses of $ 6 billion under constant demand
of mollusks up to $ 100 billion for an increasing demand with future income rise.
Frameworks and methods to study socio-economic impacts of ocean acidification in
the Mediterranean Sea are discussed by Rodrigues et al. (2012), including effects
on tourism, fishery and aquaculture.
In this paper I will examine which effects ocean acidification could have on the
optimal fishery management. In a first step I will summarize the available studies
dealing with the consequences of decreasing pH-value on the fish development,
concentrating on fish species in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea. Based on the
experimental results for Norwegian coastal cod by Frommel et al. (2012a) I demon-
strate, how results could be scaled from physiological responses to population pro-
cesses. Precisely I translate the results from Frommel et al. (2012a) into the
Ricker stock-recruitment relationship, demonstrating that recruitment success will
decrease. Using the resulting stock-recruitment relationships in an age-structured
fishery model I show, how optimal management would change under two scenarios
of future ocean acidification. I found, that a CO2 level of 1800µatm, which is
supposed to occur in the year 2300, will have a moderate effect on the optimal
fishery management. Optimal stock size as well as optimal harvest will decrease,
but will be still on a relatively high level. Under the extreme scenario of 4200µatm
I observe severe effects on the fishery with average harvest rates of only 40% of
those in the control scenario. In addition I found a tendency to pulse fishing in
the high scenario, thus ocean acidification destabilizes the fishery.
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The paper is structured as follows: In the following section I summarize bio-
logical studies about effects of decreasing pH for the development of fish stocks. In
section 3 I demonstrate how experimental results can be scaled from physiological
responses to the population process of recruitment. I set up the age-structured
fishery model in section 4 and apply it to the Norwegian coastal cod fishery in
section 5. I summarize and discuss my results in section 6.
2 Ocean acidification and its effect on fish devel-
opment
The accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will lower the pH in ocean
waters, a process termed ocean acidification. About a third of excess CO2 in
the atmosphere will be dissolved in ocean waters, leading to an estimated drop
in pH of 0.4 units (corresponding to a partial pressure of CO2 in seawater in
micro-atmosphere of ∼ 1000µatm) globally by the year 2100 and up to 0.8 units
(pCO2 ∼ 2000µatm) by the year 2300 (Caldeira and Wickett, 2003; Caldeira and
Wickett, 2005; IPCC 2007, Frommel et al., 2012a)1. Locally the effects can be
even more severe, in particular in coastal regions pCO2-values above 4000µatm in
the future could be reached in habitats where e.g. cod larvae occur (Thomsen J,
et al., 2010).
Ocean acidification could influence many physiological processes of fish as e.g.
otolith development, basal metabolic costs, aerobic scope, O2 consumption, ther-
mal tolerance, fertilization success, egg hatching and embryonic development. This
in turn may lead to reduced growth and reproductive output, increased predation
and mortality, alteration in feeding rates, and behavior, among other things (for
more details see Le Quesne and Pinnegar, 2012). While it is widely accepted that
1The measurement unit micro atmosphere (µatm) for the partial pressure of CO2 in seawa-
ter accords to the probably more common concentration measure ’parts per million ppm’, i.e.
1µatm ∼ 1ppm (See also Ishimatsu and Dissanayake, 2010). Since the data I use in the example
of Norwegian coastal cod deals with µatm I will also refer to this measurement unit.
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adult fish will most likely remain relatively unaffected by changes in seawater pH,
early life-history stages are potentially more sensitive as they lack specialized in-
ternal pH regulatory mechanism (Ishimatsu and Dissanayake, 2010; Frommel et
al., 2012a; Frommel et al, 2012b).
Several recent studies examine the effect of ocean acidification on early life-
history stages of different fish species, e.g. Baltic cod, Atlantic cod and Atlantic
herring. For the Baltic cod (Gadus morhua callarias) no detrimental effects of
ocean acidification were found. Neither the fertilization nor the early life-history
stages including hatching were influenced by higher CO2 levels (Frommel et al.,
2010, Frommel et al., 2012b). Biologists assume that the Baltic cod already
adapted to higher concentration of CO2. In particular in the Bornholm Basin,
the main spawning site of eastern Baltic cod, the CO2 concentration is already rel-
atively high, mainly due to high eutrophication supporting microbial activity and
permanent stratification with little water exchange. The development of the Baltic
cod seems therefore robust to even high levels of ocean acidification (Frommel et
al., 2012b).
For the Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), in particular for the Norwegian coastal
cod the laboratory-based study from Frommel et al. (2012a) found detrimental
effects of ocean acidification on larvae. Increasing CO2 concentration will cause
severe to lethal tissue damage in many internal organs of the larvae. In a scenario
with 1800µatm 12 % of the larvae had severe damages like multiple organ defects,
in a scenario with 4200µatm this was the case for 75% of the larvae, whereas no
damages were found in the control scenario (380µatm). Frommel et al. (2012a)
assume that most of these damages would enhance the mortality of larvae in the
open ocean. As larvae survival is the bottleneck to recruitment, ocean acidification
has the potential to act as an additional source of natural mortality, affecting
populations of already exploited fish stocks (Frommel, 2012a, Voss et al., 2012).
Another study on Atlantic herring (Clupea harengus L.) indicates that ocean
acidification could affect the metabolism of herring embryos negatively and could
result in smaller and slower-growing individuals with a lower survival potential
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due to lower feeding success and increased predation mortality (Franke, 2011). A
negative linear correlation between ocean acidification and metabolism could no
longer be detected when the highest treatment level (4635 µatm) was deleted. It
is thus possible that negative effects only occur beyond a certain tipping point.
A similar study on the inland silverside (Menidia beryllina) affirms reduced
survival and growth rates for higher CO2 levels (Baumann et al., 2011). At a CO2
level of ∼1000 ppm (µatm) larvae survival was reduced by 74%, average length
by 18% compared to the present-day CO2 level of ∼400 ppm (µatm). Reduced
larval growth induces higher mortality rates, because slower-growing larval co-
horts are vulnerable to predators for a longer time and therefore experience higher
cumulative mortalities (Baumann et al., 2011).
Beside the direct influence on early-life stages some species could be indirectly
affected by ocean acidification. Higher physiological stress due to more acidic wa-
ter could cause a higher oxygen demand. Oxygen is in particular needed for fish
growth. In regions where the oxygen concentration is already low ocean acidifica-
tion could further slow down growth and could result in lower maximum length
and weight (Teschner et al., 2010). Alternatively, a shift towards oxygen richer
regions might occur, leading to a lower harvestable biomass (Cheung et al., 2011).
Indirect effects of higher CO2-level on the food web, especially phytoplankton, are
also possible. Changes in phytoplankton size structure affect the amount of en-
ergy transferred to higher trophic levels (fish) which in turns could have positive or
negative consequences for fish growth and carrying capacity (Cheung et al., 2011).
To sum up, fish development could be negatively influenced by ocean acidifica-
tion, especially in the process of recruitment. But further analyses are needed to
examine the long-term effects of higher CO2-levels in ocean waters on fish stocks
and their biotic environment.
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3 Scaling from physiological responses to popula-
tion processes
Recent biological studies mostly refer to effects of ocean acidification on physiolog-
ical processes. Considering the potential impact of ocean acidification on fisheries
requires scaling from physiological responses to population- and ecosystem-level
processes. A simple way is to consider how ocean acidification could modify the
parameters of growth, mortality and reproduction in a single-species model (Le
Quesne and Pinnegar, 2012). Here I concentrate on the modification of the pa-
rameters of the stock-recruitment relationship in an age-structured fishery model.
I assume, that egg production, N0, is proportional to spawning stock, ssb,
i.e. N0 = f ssb, where f is the net fecundity in the population (Hilborn and
Walters, 1992). The development of the early-life history follows dN
dt
= −ZtN ,
where N(0) = N0, T is the life stage where the recruits enter the fish stock, i.e.
N(T ) ≡ R and Zt denotes the mortality at life stage t. The mortality at life
stage t, Zt, is made up of both density-independent and density-dependent effects:
Zt = a+ b ssb, where a refers to the density-independent mortality and b accounts
for density-dependency, i.e. the spawning stock inhibits the population of young
fish before recruitment, e.g. through cannibalism (Quinn and Deriso, 1999). The
differential equation then becomes:
dN
dt
= −(a+ b ssb)N (1)
with its solution
N(t) = N0 e
−(a+b ssb)t. (2)
For t = T ,N0 = fssb and N(T ) ≡ R equation (2) becomes the Ricker stock-
recruitment function
R = f e−aT ssb e−b Tssb, (3)
or, in its usual notation R = α ssb e−βssb, where α = f e−aT and β = bT .
Following Frommel et al. (2012a) ocean acidification causes severe tissue dam-
ages in the larvae which is likely to result in a higher larval mortality rate. For
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simplicity I assume that these effects will only influence the density-independent
mortality during the whole recruitment phase aT and that the severe tissue dam-
ages in the larvae will result in an increased mortality of exact the same magnitude.
Thus, I assume that aT will change such that (aT )′ = (1+d)aT , where d is the rate
of acidic-induced enhanced larvae mortality during the whole recruitment phase.
For the parameter α I then get α′ = f e−(1+d) aT . After rearranging I have the
following relationship between the original parameter α and the altered parameter
α′:
α′ = f−dα1+d
As found by Franke et al. (2011) and Baumann et al. (2011) ocean acidification
could enhance the vulnerability of larvae to predation. It is also possible that
ocean acidification affects the food chain, positively by increasing the food supply
or negatively by limiting food supply. Both incidents would affect the density-
dependent part of the mortality rate Zt, i.e. the parameter bT . A higher (lower)
density-dependent mortality would imply higher (lower) values of bT and thus
would translate into an one-to-one increase (decrease) in the parameter β.
To sum up, ocean acidification is likely to cause a decrease in the parameter
α of the Ricker stock-recruitment function and/or an increase (decrease) in the
parameter β. A decrease in α together with an increase in β would unambiguously
result in a lower stock-recruitment curve and thus in lower recruitment success. If
both, α and β, decrease, the overall effect on the recruitment would be ambiguous:
R1(ssb) :
{
< R0(ssb) , if ssb < − log(α0)−log(α1)β1−β0
> R0(ssb) , else
For low (high) stock levels the recruitment under ocean acidification, i.e. R1(ssb)
with α1 < α0 and β0 < β1, will be lower (higher) than the recruitment under
current pCO2-levels R0(ssb).
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4 Age-structured fishery model
For my age-structured fishery model I refer to the model by Tahvonen et al. (2012)
who determined optimal harvesting of an age-structured fishery. Let xat denote
the number of fish (in 103 individuals) in each age class a = 1, ....., A and at
the beginning of each period t = 0, 1, .... The population dynamics of the age-
structured fish stock are given by:
x1,t+1 = r
(
A∑
a=1
mawa xat
)
≡ R(ssbt), (4)
xa+1,t+1 = ba (xat − φaEt xat) , a = 1, ..., A− 2, (5)
xA,t+1 = bA−1 (xA−1,t − φA−1Et xA−1,t)+ (6)
bA (xAt − φAEt xAt) , (7)
where ba, a = 1, ..., A are age-specific survival rates, ma, a = 1, ..., A the proportion
mature at age a, wa the weight of a fish at age a (in kg), φa, a = 1, ..., A are age-
specific catchability parameters, and R(ssbt) is the Ricker stock-recruitment func-
tion (see section 3) with the spawning stock biomass ssbt given by
∑A
a=1mawa xat.
The total annual catch (in tons) is given by Ht =
∑A
a=1waφaEt xat. Solving for
fishing effort in year t, Et, I get:
Et =
Ht∑A
a=1waφa xat
, (8)
such that (5) and (7) can be rewritten as
xa+1,t+1 = ba xat −HtGat, a = 1, ..., A− 2, (9)
xA,t+1 = bA−1 xA−1,t + bA xAt −HtGA−1,t, (10)
where
Gat =
ba φa xat∑A
a=1waφa xat
(11)
GA−1,t =
bA−1 φA−1,t xA−1 + bA φA,t xA∑A
a=1waφa xat
. (12)
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Thus, Gat, a = 1, ..., A− 1, t = 0, 1, ... are variables that transform the total catch
Ht to the numbers of fish harvested from each age class.
The objective function I apply is to maximize the net present value of utility
from harvesting fish:
∞∑
t=0
ρt
1
1− ν [pHt − C(Ht, Xt)]
1−ν , (13)
where Xt =
∑A
a=1wa xat denote the total stock biomass in period t.
The Lagrangian and the first order conditions are
L =
∞∑
t=0
ρt

1
1−ν
[
pHt − C(Ht,
∑A
a=1wa xat)
]1−ν
+
λ1t
(
r(
∑A
a=1mawa xat)x1,t+1
)
+∑A−2
a=1 λa+1,t (ba xat −HtGat − xa+1,t+1)+
λAt (bA−1 xA−1,t + bA xAt −HtGA−1,t − xA,t+1)
 , (14)
∂L
∂Ht
ρ−t = (pHt − C(Ht, Xt))−ν
(
p− ∂C(Ht, Xt)
∂Ht
)
−
A−1∑
a=1
λa+1,tGat = 0, (15)
∂L
∂xa+1,t+1
ρ−t = ρ (pHt+1 − C(Ht+1, Xt+1))−ν
(
− ∂C
∂xa+1,t+1
)
+
ρ λ1,t+1r
′ma+1wa+1 − λa+1,t+
ρ λa+2,t+1 ba+1 − ρHt+1
A−1∑
j=1
λj+1,t+1
∂Gj,t+1
∂xa+1,t+1
= 0 (16)
5 Application to Norwegian coastal cod
I apply my age-structure fishery model to the Norwegian coastal cod (NCC) fish-
ery. The Norwegian coastal cod live and spawn in a large number of fjords along
the Norwegian coast north of 62◦ latitude (ICES 2012, Frommel et al. 2012a).
As Frommel et al. (2012a) point out these high latitudes are particularly im-
pacted by future ocean acidification with predicted pH values of 7.7 to occur by
2100, and even lower values in some parts of the Arctic Ocean, since cold water
is able to take up relatively more atmospheric CO2. In general a higher acidity
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of coastal waters could be caused by persistent or episodic acid inputs resulting
from river water, upwelling of deep CO2-rich, low pH seawater, bottom sediments,
atmospheric deposition of terrigenous materials, or acidic wastage of aquaculture
(Ishimatsu and Dissanayake, 2010). Frommel et al. (2012a) investigate the effects
on ocean acidification on NCC larvae in three different scenarios: a control sce-
nario with 380µatm, representing the current pCO2-level, a medium scenario with
1800µatm, a level which is likely to occur by the year 2300, and a high scenario
with 4200µatm as an extreme coastal upwelling scenario possible for the spawning
areas of NCC.
The NCC is fished throughout the year within the 12 nautical mile zone at
the Norwegian coast. Biomass and catches had been quite high in 1980s and
in the middle of the 1990s with an average of 350,000 tonnes or 80,000 tonnes,
respectively, but have been at relatively low levels (180,000 tonnes; 35,000-40,000
tonnes) in the last 10 years (Figure 1, ICES 2012). Recreational fisheries take an
important fraction of the catches, especially near coastal cities and in some fjords
where commercial fishing activity is low. Estimated catches in the recreational
fishery represents about 35% of the total catch in recent years (ICES, 2011)
The habitat of the NCC overlaps with the habitat of the Northeast Arctic cod
(NEAC). Total allowable catches (TAC) is a combined TAC for both the NEAC
stock and NCC stock. Both species can only be distinguished by examining their
otoliths. Samplings from cod catches taken inside 12 n.mile in 2010 and 2011 yield
a portion of NCC of 37.75% and 31.67% respectively (ICES 2012).
5.1 Estimation of parameter values
To estimate the stock-recruitment relationship I use ICES data for the Norwegian
coastal cod for the years 1984 to 2011 (ICES 2012). I estimate the logarithm of
the Ricker stock-recruitment relationship of section 3, i.e.
log(Rt) = log(αˆssbte
βˆ ssbt) + t, (17)
70
Figure 1: Norwegian coastal cod. Total stock biomass and total landings for the
years 1884-2011.
where  is a normally distributed random variable N(0, σ2). Nonlinear least square
yield the following parameters αˆ = 0.4954 with confidence interval (0.28, 0.71),
and βˆ = 2.5833 with (-0.59, 5.76).
As illustrated in section 3, ocean acidification is likely to increase the density-
independent mortality during the recruitment phase aT and thus to decrease α.
The estimated α refer to the current pCO2 level of 380µatm. Frommel et al.
(2012a) found that under the medium scenario of 1800µatm 12% of the larvae
exhibit severe to lethal tissue damages, under the high scenario of 4200µatm this
is the case for 75% of the larvae. Using my method from section 3 I can translate
these data to α′ = f−0.12α1.12 for the medium scenario and α′′ = f−0.75α1.75 for the
high scenario.
With the data I have it is not possible to estimate fecundity f and density-
independent mortality a separately. I thus assume a fecundity parameter equal
to one, such that the relation between α and α′ (α′′) simplifies to α′ = α1.12
(α′′ = α1.75). Note that, if f is below one α′ will be lower, if f is above one α′
will be higher than under my assumption. With the estimates for the control case
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Figure 2: Influence of ocean acidification on the stock-recruitment relationship.
I thus get α′ = 0.4554 for the medium scenario and α′′ = 0.2925 for the high
scenario. The resulting stock-recruitment curves are plotted in figure 2. As can
be clearly seen, ocean acidification is likely to result in lower recruitment success
given a certain spawning stock biomass.
For the other parameters, i.e. age-specific survival rate, weight at age and age
specific maturity I also use ICES data and take the average over the years 1995 to
2011. The age-specific catchability I calculate with the help of the instantaneous
age-specific fishing mortality rates F. I normalized the highest fishing mortality
rate to one and determine the catchability of different age classes in relation to the
catchability of this age class. The parameters are assembled in table 1.
For the cost structure of catching cod I refer to Richter et al. (2012), who have
2Since data for age class 1 is not available I approximated it by using the number of age class
2 and the natural mortality rate of 0.2, i.e. 19318 ∗ e0.2
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Age-class Maturity Weight Catchability Survival rate Numbers
ma wa (kg) φa ba 2011 [103]
1 0 0.078 0.00 e−0.2 235952
2 0 0.3628 0.01 e−0.2 19318
3 0.02 0.9192 0.09 e−0.2 14665
4 0.15 1.7325 0.32 e−0.2 10541
5 0.45 2.4088 0.56 e−0.2 6475
6 0.69 3.1853 0.77 e−0.2 4471
7 0.87 4.3792 1 e−0.2 2129
8 0.89 5.5797 0.9 e−0.2 1295
9 0.96 7.1616 0.71 e−0.2 693
10 0.98 10.5224 0.71 e−0.2 941
Table 1: Parameters used in the age-structured fishery model
estimated the cost and demand structure of the Norwegian cod fishery for different
vessel types. I use their estimation for the coastal vessels, since Norwegian coastal
cod is mainly caught inside the fjords or offshore by smaller vessels. Richter et
al. concentrated on the Northeast Arctic cod. But as already mentioned, when
catching cod inside the 12 nautical mile zone both species cannot be distinguished.
Thus, I assume a joint production of NEAC and NCC and apply the cost structure
of Richter et al. (2012) to my model by replacing Ht = ht,NCC + hNEAC and
Xt = Xt,NCC + XNEAC . While doing so, I assume that biomass and harvest
rates of NEAC are fixed throughout the years. As a reference scenario I take the
steady state values for harvest and biomass from Richter et al. (2012), which are
X∗NEAC = 3.41 million tons and h∗NEAC = 0.67 million tons.
The production process of a vessel is described by a Cobb-Douglas harvest
function, where the amount of cod harvested in a given year (Ht) is a function of
the vessel’s effective fishing effort (Et) and the total amount of cod biomass (Xt),
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i.e.
Ht = q X
χ
t E
γ
t (18)
(ht,NCC + hNEAC) = q (Xt,NCC +XNEAC)
χEγt (19)
Here, q is a catchability coefficient, χ is the stock-output elasticity and γ is the
effort-output elasticity. Effort Et is the number of days catching cod multiplied
by the vessel’s Gross Tonnage, i.e. effort is measured in efficiency units – tonnage
days. Solving for effort yields Et = (
(ht,NCC+hNEAC)
q (Xt,NCC+XNEAC)χ
)1/γ.
Regarding the cost of catching cod Richter et al. (2012) distinguish between
fixed costs (k) and variable costs (v). Hence, the annual costs of a coastal vessel
spending E tonnage days catching cod are given by
ct = k + v Et. (20)
Combining equations (18) and (20) then yields
ct = k + v
( Ht
q Xχt
)1/γ (21)
ct = k + v
( (ht,NCC + hNEAC)
q (Xt,NCC +Xt,NEAC)χ
)1/γ
. (22)
With the parameter estimated by Richter et al. (2012) I have
ct = 0.37 + 99.51
( (ht,NCC + hNEAC)
0.032(Xt,NCC +Xt,NEAC)0.41
)1/0.79
. (23)
.
For the demand function I assume a fixed price for NCC. Landings of NCC are
small relative to those of NEAC, such that changes in landings of NCC will not
change the price for cod. Following Richter et al. (2012) the average inflation-
corrected ex-vessel price obtained for one kilogram of cod fish are 17.32 NOK for
coastal vessels. Finally I assume that fishermen are risk averse with a coefficient
of constant relative risk aversion of ν = 0.75, see equation (13).
5.2 Results
I determine the optimal fishery management for three scenarios of ocean acidifica-
tion: 1) the control scenario with 380µatm, 2) a medium scenario with 1800µatm
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and 3) a high scenario with 4200µatm. The optimal development of the harvest
and the total stock for the three scenarios, given an interest rate of 2% or 10%, are
shown in figures 3 and 4. In the control and medium scenario the optimal solution
is an almost smooth path toward a constant population level. On the contrary I
observe the tendency to pulse fishing in the high scenario, in particular for higher
interest rates.
Given an interest rate of 2% the steady-state stock size equals 490,730 tons
for the control scenario, 463,480 tons for the medium scenario and about 329,240
tons for the high scenario. The corresponding steady state harvest rates are 77,457
tons for the control, 69,806 tons for the medium scenario and about 37,573 tons
for the high scenario. The difference in harvest possibilities relative to the control
scenario is thus 7,651 tons in the medium scenario and 39,884 tons in the high
scenario, which translates in an annual loss of 131 million NOK for the medium
and 687 million NOK in the high scenario.
Given an interest rate of 10% I get a steady state stock size of 359,700 (327,330)
tons and a steady state harvest rate of 68,700 (60,640) tons in the control (medium)
scenario. But the optimal solution differs completely for the high scenario of ocean
acidification. With pulse fishing the amount of harvest fluctuates heavily between
0 tons and 88,000 tons with an inter-annual average of about 27,000 tons. The
average harvest is only 40% of the harvest in the control case, but the maximum
harvest rates are much higher than the steady state values in the control and
medium scenarios. At the same time the stock size decreases to an average of
160,000, tons which is less than the half of the steady state stock size in the
control case.
Pulse fishing, or fishing heavily at regular intervals rather than continually,
could occur as a consequence of unperfect selectivity in the fishing gear. It will also
emerge whenever pulse fishing may produce higher yields than fishing constantly
with a lower effort (Clark, 1990). In my example I observe pulse fishing under
the extreme levels of ocean acidification and a relatively high interest rate of 10%.
Although the main reason will supposedly lie in the non-selectivity of the fishing
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gear, ocean acidification is likely to further destabilize the system. In particular
pulse fishing could be fostered by the low recruitment success under extremely low
pH-values. If the annual growth in terms of recruitment is very low, it could be
more profitable to wait some years until the stock has accumulated rather than
fishing a constant - but probably small - fraction of the fish stock every year.
My results also show that the impact of the interest rate is at least as strong
as the effect of ocean acidification. The difference in optimal harvest between the
two interest rates is as high as the respective difference between the control and
medium scenario. Further, pulse fishing in the high scenario only occurs for a high
interest rate of 10%. Thus, ocean acidification is only one determinant and in the
short run less important than economic parameters like the interest rate.
6 Discussion
In this paper I examined how ocean acidification could influence the optimal fishery
management. I have demonstrated how results from laboratory-based experiments
could be scaled from physiological responses to population processes like the stock-
recruitment relationship.
On the example of the Norwegian coastal cod I have shown, that decreasing pH-
values under ocean acidification will most likely decrease the recruitment success
and will thus result in a lower harvestable biomass and lower harvest rates. I
could demonstrate that the consequences will be moderate under a scenario with
1800µatm, predicted for the year 2300, but will be severe under an extreme coastal
upwelling scenario of 4200µatm. Under the medium scenario harvest will decrease
by about 10% (12%) given an interest rate of 2% (10%), whereas the high scenario
will result in 52% (60%) lower inter-annual average harvests. In addition I observed
the tendency to pulse fishing in the high scenario under an interest rate of 10%.
Although my results show that ocean acidification could have negative effects
on the harvestable biomass and thus on harvest possibilities, many questions still
remain open: My analysis is restricted by the limited knowledge about the concrete
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consequences of ocean acidification on the physiology of specific fish species. I
assumed that decreasing pH-values have a detrimental effect on the recruitment
of the fish stock. The negative effect on stock productivity might be enhanced by
effects on the metabolism and thus on the growth of the fish stock (Cheung et al.,
2012).
Beside these direct effects on the physiology of a fish species it could have
indirect impacts via ecological interactions, such as alteration in the food web
or habitat. For example, higher CO2-levels could increase the primary production
and could thus increase the food supply which in turn could result in higher growth
rates of some fish species (Le Quesne and Pinnegar, 2012). Furthermore, ocean
acidification is only one component of multiple pressures like fishing, habitat mod-
ification, climate change, species introduction and nutrient enrichment and should
be considered in this context as these pressures could have both interactive and
cumulative impacts (Le Quesne and Pinnegar, 2012).
Another limitation of my studies is, that I could not examine the effects of
ocean acidification in the short run. The underlying experimental data I used in
my model starts with an already relatively high level of pCO2 in ocean waters, i.e.
1800µatm as predicted for the year 2300. Data for intermediate levels are missing,
but necessary to learn, which effects ocean acidification would have for the next
50-100 years (Denman et al., 2010).
In addition I didn’t include possible evolutionary adjustment processes into
my consideration (see also Cheung et al., 2011). Looking at the robustness of the
Eastern Baltic cod with respect to even extreme levels of ocean acidification it is
very likely, that other fish species are also able to adjust to higher CO2 levels in
the long run. “[L]abratory-based experiments are limited in their ability to inform
on potential for long-term adaptation to a pressure that gradually develops, the
response of a few individuals exposed to an abrupt change over a few days or
weeks may significantly differ from the response of individuals in a population
that is exposed to gradually increasing acidification over decades or centuries”
(Le Quesne and Pinnegar, 2012) It is thus not unlikely that the found effects of
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decreased pH-values are highly overestimated and that actual effects will be less
severe.
Hence, this paper is just a first step toward including experimental data on
biological effects of ocean acidification into ecological-economic models. Further
research will be needed, in particular on the ecosystem level, to get reliable results
as a basis for adaptive fishery management under ongoing ocean acidification.
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